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Much of the current debate in corporate governance is framed in terms 
of stakeholder versus shareholder forms of corporate governance.  While 
one would find little debate that stakeholders’ interests are important to any 
business, there is substantial debate regarding whether any stakeholder 
besides shareholders should have a formal role in corporate governance.  
What has been largely ignored in this debate is the issue of private 
ordering:  since corporate law is largely enabling rather than mandatory, 
can stakeholder governance structures be voluntarily created within the 
current shareholder-centric default corporate law structure?  This article 
argues that this is clearly the case, sets forth specific methods for how this 
can be accomplished, and discusses the implications this has for 
stakeholder democracy and other stakeholder-centric corporate law reforms 
which have been put forth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well-established that for any corporation or business entity, there 
are multiple parties, commonly referred to as “stakeholders,” who have an 
interest in the well-being of the entity and its business endeavors.1  One 
would find little debate either in academic or professional business 
literature that to successfully manage a business, managers and boards of 
directors must consider, either directly or indirectly, the interests of these 
stakeholders.2  There is substantial debate, however, regarding whether any 
 
 1.  See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, ET. AL., Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art, 30-50 
(2010) (discussing the development of stakeholder theory throughout the business literature 
and the origins of the term). 
 2.  See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function, 12 Bus. Ethics Q. 235, 241 (2002) (arguing that business 
firms should follow the single objective of long-term market value maximization, but that 
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stakeholder besides the shareholders of a corporation should have any 
formal role in corporate governance and particularly whether their interests 
should ever be on equal or similar footing to those of the shareholders.3 
Within the corporate governance literature, when discussions of 
stakeholder rights arise, the conversation almost invariably turns toward the 
norm of shareholder primacy and whether corporate law needs to be 
reformed to formally include other stakeholders in the decision-making 
hierarchy of the corporate entity.4  The idea that non-shareholder 
stakeholders should have a formal role in corporate governance is 
commonly referred to as “stakeholder democracy.”5  The aim of this article 
is not to directly engage in that debate, not because it is unimportant or 
uninteresting but because it is well-worn and it is highly unlikely that any 
alternative mandatory corporate governance arrangement will displace the 
default assumption of shareholder primacy long imbedded in corporate law.  
Rather, the goal of this article is to focus on a topic that is related to this 
debate but far less discussed and arguably much more important: could a 
corporation with a formal governance role for multiple stakeholders, not 
just shareholders, be created under existing corporate law?  That is to say, 
 
this will not be accomplished unless the interests of all firm’s stakeholders are taken into 
account because “it is obvious that we cannot maximize the long-term market value of an 
organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1043, 1044 (2008) (arguing that corporate governance should not be focused on 
shareholders only and that other stakeholders should have a role in the governance of the 
firm); but see George W. Dent, Jr. Stakeholder Governance:  A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1144 (2008) (arguing against stakeholder governance and 
stating: “Shareholder primacy—real shareholder primacy, not the counterfeit version we 
have now—is the corporate governance system that holders the greatest promise for both 
investors and employees.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 4.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 
EMORY L.J. 948, 975-983 (2008) (arguing that stakeholder governance is a more optimal 
from of corporate governance than a shareholder-centric model, and advocating changes to 
corporate law to accommodate this); see also Anselm Schneider & Andreas Georg Scherer, 
Corporate Governance in a Risk Society, 126 J. BUS. ETHICS 309, 310 (2015) (arguing that 
corporate governance based upon shareholder primacy is inadequate and conceptualizing a 
more democratized form of corporate governance through both law and soft law); see also 
Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: 
Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 145,166 
(2012) (discussing implementation of more stakeholder focused governance models almost 
exclusively in terms of changes to law, not voluntary stakeholder focus under existing 
corporate law). 
 5.  Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, What is Stakeholder Democracy? Perspectives and 
Issues, 14 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 6, 6 (2005) (“‘Stakeholder democracy’ is an intriguing 
idea.  The basic proposition – that stakeholders participate in processes of organizing, 
decision making, and governance in corporations – is for many people an alluring 
prospect.”). 
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can some measure of stakeholder democracy, or some other stakeholder-
centric alternative to shareholder primacy, be voluntarily created under 
existing law without waiting for legal reform? 
This is a question of critical importance because there are vocal 
advocates for stakeholder democracy who argue that managing the 
corporation in the interests of all stakeholders will result in more optimal 
societal outcomes.6  The basic underlying logic of stakeholder democracy is 
an extension of stakeholder theory – if interests of multiple important 
stakeholder groups matter to the firm, then these multiple stakeholder 
groups, not just shareholders, should have an opportunity to engage in the 
governance of the corporation through some type of participation in 
decision making.7  If such a form of corporate governance truly is superior 
to the dominant shareholder-centric position of corporate law, then 
businesspeople and lawyers alike should not wait for the law to catch up 
and force the adoption of stakeholder governance principles.  Rather, 
companies should voluntarily begin to adopt such governance principles to 
the extent possible.  Indeed, if stakeholder democracy is actually superior 
to the current corporate governance model, its voluntary adoption could at 
the very least be a source of competitive advantage for forward-thinking 
companies who adopt such an arrangement absent legal mandate and at 
best begin a revolution in corporate governance that leads to more inclusive 
and socially beneficial business organizations. 
In this article, I address this previously ignored issue and argue that it 
is clearly the case that existing corporate law allows for the creation of 
corporate entities in which multiple stakeholders have a formal role in 
governance. Because modern corporate law consists largely (although not 
entirely) of default statutory provisions that can be modified by the 
corporate contract,8 through creative drafting, a corporation can be arranged 
in such a way to give at least some governance authority to multiple 
stakeholders.  This article further contributes to the literature by providing 
specific examples of corporate governance arrangements that can be 
utilized to create varying levels of stakeholder democracy under existing 
corporate law.  Certainly through creative lawyering, even more could be 
imagined. 
By focusing on what private actors are capable of under existing 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Schneider & Scherer, supra note 4, at 315 (advocating for a readjustment 
of the scope of corporate governance towards a stakeholder democracy approach to better 
allocate risk and legitimize business organizations). 
 7.  See Matten & Crane, supra note 5, at 7-8 (discussing the emergence of stakeholder 
democracy from the broader concept of stakeholder theory). 
 8.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1549, 1553 (1989) (discussing how corporate statutes consist of both mandatory and 
default provisions, which govern a corporation’s inner workings). 
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corporate law rather than focusing on how corporate law can be reformed 
to force new governance arrangements on private actors, more interesting 
questions regarding the nature of corporate governance and corporate law 
arise.  If a stakeholder governed corporation can be created, why is it not 
commonplace that such corporations are formed?  This lack of stakeholder 
governed corporations is particularly perplexing if stakeholder theorists are 
correct in their assertion that managing in the interests of stakeholders 
results in better financial results than the traditional shareholder focus.9  If 
it is the case that managing for stakeholder welfare is value maximizing, 
why have market forces not resulted in corporate arrangements that 
emphasize stakeholder governance, as contractarians would predict?10  
Surely, shareholders would gladly give up a portion of the limited 
governance rights they have if they would receive higher profits in return.  
Rather than addressing this pressing issue, most stakeholder rights 
advocates continue to argue for a greater emphasis on stakeholder rights in 
corporate governance by insisting that existing corporate law either 
impedes or prevents considering stakeholder’s interests in corporate 
decision-making.11 This results in a misguided push for legal reform to 
require corporate entities to consider non-shareholder stakeholders in 
corporate governance rather than focusing on how private actors can 
 
 9.  See Silvia Ayuso, et. al., Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance, 53 BUS. & SOC’Y 414, 425 
(2014) (conducting an empirical analysis of stakeholder engagement and firm financial 
performance and finding that across a sample of 426 firms engaging stakeholders has a 
significant positive effect on financial performance). 
 10.  See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Larry from the Left: An 
Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 121, 125-26 (2014) (discussing the contractarian view 
of the firm, which states that corporations are networks of contracts and corporate law 
provides largely default rules which the parties are free to alter to reach corporate 
arrangements that are value maximizing). 
 11.  Schneider & Scherer, supra note 4, at 315 (advocating for a readjustment of the 
scope of corporate governance towards a stakeholder democracy approach to better allocate 
risk and legitimize business organizations); see also, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 
37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 763 (2014) (arguing for the formal integration of stakeholders 
into corporate governance by expanding fiduciary obligations to all stakeholders of the 
firm); see also, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 253, 308-309 (2009) (arguing for the rights for consumers to vote in 
corporate elections, and also discussing granting other stakeholders the right to such a vote); 
see also, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 1, 23-25 (2008) (arguing that changes to corporate law are necessary to 
overcome the problems created by shareholder primacy and that one such helpful change 
would be requiring corporations to consider non-shareholder stakeholder interests and to 
give these stakeholders a mechanism for electing representatives to the board of directors); 
see also, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 
181, 228-29 (2013) (arguing that the norm of shareholder primacy needs to be changed to a 
to a multi-stakeholder governance model).  
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advance stakeholder governance under the existing legal regime.12 
This article proceeds in three parts.  Part I begins with an explanation 
of stakeholder theory and the related concept of stakeholder democracy, 
and discusses the role that the concept of stakeholder democracy plays in 
the discussion of management and corporation governance.  Part II 
provides a brief discussion of the structure of modern United States 
corporate law and the role that private ordering plays in this structure, and 
sets forth different methods for how a stakeholder governed corporate 
structure could be created under this extant legal structure.  Part II also 
addresses how a voluntary form of stakeholder governance is actually more 
consistent with the philosophical basis of stakeholder theory and is a 
superior method for addressing stakeholder rights than reforming corporate 
law to require stakeholder governance.  Part III posits and analyzes various 
explanations for why we do not commonly see stakeholder governed 
corporations in spite of the fact that they are allowed by corporate law, and 
discusses the implications this raises for stakeholder theory and alternative 
corporate governance arrangements in general.  Finally, this article offers 
concluding remarks. 
I. STAKEHOLDERS AND STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Most modern calls for increased democracy in corporate governance 
share stakeholder theory as their intellectual starting point.13  What has 
been referred to as “stakeholder theory” is actually more akin to a broad 
concept of corporate management and business ethics that has been applied 
in management and corporate governance settings in a myriad of ways.14  
This has led to some level of conflict among stakeholder theorists, as some 
argue the theory requires changes to the law to put at least some non-
shareholder stakeholders on equal footing with shareholders while others 
have argued that the focus on stakeholder theory is managerial, and the 
theory is agnostic with respect to the legal norm of shareholder primacy.15  
 
 12.  Id.   
 13.  See Matten & Crane, supra note 5, at 7 (2005) (discussing how stakeholder 
democracy arose from the growth of stakeholder theory). 
 14.  See Robert Phillips, R. Edward Freeman, & Andrew C. Wicks, What Stakeholder 
Theory is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479, 479-80 (2003) (discussing the conceptual breadth of 
stakeholder theory and noting that this breadth has left the theory open to misapplication and 
critique); see also John Kaler, Differentiating Stakeholder Theories, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 
72 (2003) (discussing differences between different versions of stakeholder theory). 
 15.  Phillips, et al., supra note 14, at 480, 491 (“The notion of strict stakeholder 
equality, application of the theory either to the entire economy or exclusively to large, 
publicly held corporations, and concerns with changes in the law and corporate governance 
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While stakeholder theory has grown to encompass many broad and 
sometimes divergent concepts, which some stakeholder theorists 
welcome,16 it is possible to find certain common elements of this theory 
that virtually all forms of stakeholder theory conform to in some degree. 
A. General Tenets of Stakeholder Theory 
The core of stakeholder theory is that businesses have multiple 
constituent entities (termed “stakeholders”) which can affect or are affected 
by the businesses’ actions, and that these stakeholders’ interests must be 
managed for the business to be successful.17  Thus, stakeholder theory is 
often characterized as being opposed to the shareholder primacy model of 
the corporation, or at least opposed to a focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization as the proper objective of the corporation.18  While individual 
stakeholder theorists may differ as to degree, stakeholder theory writ large 
is concerned with both distributive aspects of stakeholder management 
(who benefits from firm outcomes) as well decision-making aspects (which 
stakeholders get a say in managerial decision making).19 
A common issue that arises when managing the various stakeholders 
 
are common in the literature among stakeholder theory apologists and critics alike” but 
noting “discourse concerning the legal relationship between the organization and its 
stakeholders is welcome, but the theory does not require a change in the law to remain 
viable.”). 
 16.  See R. Edward Freeman, Divergent Stakeholder Theory, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 
233, 235-36 (1999) (discussing the value of diverging narratives of stakeholder theory, 
stating: “What we need is a conversation that encourages such divergent views, but one that 
quickly throws out those views that are not useful, not simple, and that do not show us how 
it is possible to live better.”). 
 17.  Freeman, et. al., supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the genesis of stakeholder theory and 
noting “People engaged in value creation and trade are responsible precisely to ‘those 
groups and individuals who can affect or be affected by their actions’ – that is, 
stakeholders.”). 
 18.  Phillips, et al., supra note 14, at 486 (“[S]takeholder theory, when applied to for-
profit business organizations, is consistent with value maximization.  We should distinguish, 
however, between value maximization and maximizing shareholder wealth or stock 
value/share price.”) (emphasis in original); see also Kaler, supra note 14, at 71 (“What is 
common to stakeholder theory is fairly well established.  Though compromises on both 
sides can obviously blur differences, the primary feature is generally taken to be 
contradistinctiveness from the stockholder (U.S.) or shareholder value (U.K.) conception of 
the company: the view that the ultimate purpose of a company should be serving the 
interests of its shareholders.”) (internal citations omitted).   
 19.  Phillips, et al., at 487 (“Who gets how much of the organizational outcomes pie is 
an important question, but so is who gets a say in how the pie is baked.  Stakeholder theory 
is concerned with who has input in decision-making as well as with who benefits from the 
outcomes of such decisions.  Procedure is as important to stakeholder theory as the final 
distribution.”). 
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of a firm is that there will invariably be times when their interests will 
conflict.20  When this happens, whose interests win out?  Whose interests 
should the manager prefer?  Critics of stakeholder theory point out that the 
theory provides no concrete answer to this critical question, resulting in 
managers having little to no accountability for their decisions.21  Unlike 
shareholder primacy, which states that shareholder interests always 
predominate, stakeholder theory does not definitively say which 
stakeholder(s) the firm should distribute the most to and which 
stakeholder(s) should matter the most to managerial decision-making.22  
Thus, when faced with difficult business decisions, critics argue that 
stakeholder theory does not provide the same managerial certainty that a 
shareholder primacy view does – since shareholders are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of firm success, any trade-offs should be made in their favor.23 
Earlier articulations of stakeholder theory answered this critique by 
stating that the world is a complex place that defies easy answers, and thus 
the role of the manager is to “balance” these stakeholders’ interests without 
necessarily always preferring one particular stakeholder(s) to the others in 
every situation.24  However, as the theory has developed, more recent 
 
 20.  See Jensen, supra note 2, at 241 (discussing stakeholder theory and conflict among 
stakeholder interests and noting “Any theory of action must tell the actors, in this case 
managers and boards of directors, how to choose among multiple competing and 
inconsistent constituent interests.”).   
 21.  See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory provides no guidance other 
than to “balance” stakeholder interests when they conflict, which is unhelpful to the decision 
maker); see also Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
533, 543 (2006) (discussing the problems with having managerial responsibility to multiple 
stakeholder groups, and noting that it creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the 
potential conflicts between the various stakeholder groups). 
 22.  See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of 
Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215, 219 (2002) (noting that the broader the 
conception of who is a stakeholder becomes “the deeper the conflicts among stakeholder 
interests will become; the greater number of different stakeholders one recognizes, the more 
divergent and irreconcilable their interests.”). 
 23.  See e.g. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.  Those standards include acting to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”); see also Jensen, 
supra note 2 at 246 (noting this problem and arguing for an “enlightened stakeholder 
theory” that uses long-term market value maximization of the firm’s stock, more similar to 
the shareholder model, as the single objective “tiebreaker” for decision making).  
 24.  R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH, 53 
(1984) (“[A]n organization which understands its stakeholder map and the stakes for each 
group, which has organizational processes to take these groups and their stakes into account 
routinely as part of the standard operating procedures of the organization and which 
implements a set of transactions or bargains to balance the interests of these stakeholders to 
achieve the organization’s purpose, would be said to have high (or superior) stakeholder 
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articulations claim that a focus on the divergent nature of stakeholders’ 
interests is misplaced.25  Rather, the manager’s task is to reframe these 
apparent conflicts to focus on the joint, cooperative nature of the 
stakeholders’ interests.26  By focusing on the joint nature of stakeholder 
relationships, the manager can first find ways to create value for all 
stakeholders without resorting to trade-offs between them.27  Only after 
attempts at joint value creation have been exhausted should the manager 
then focus on trading-off between stakeholder interests.28 
B. Stakeholder Democracy in Corporate Governance 
Advocates of stakeholder democracy essentially argue that if 
stakeholder theory is correct in that shareholders have no greater claim to 
managerial attention than other stakeholders, then it stands to reason that 
management should be accountable to non-shareholder stakeholders in 
some manner similar to its accountability to shareholders.29  In earlier 
stakeholder theory writings, it was common for stakeholder theorists to 
advocate for some form of stakeholder democracy as an integral part of 
stakeholder theory.30  However, many, but not all, stakeholder theorists 
have moved away from calls for formal stakeholder democracy and have 
 
management capability.”). 
 25.  See Freeman, et. al., supra note 1, at 27 (“Many thinkers see the dominant problem 
of stakeholder theory as how to solve the priority problem, or ‘which stakeholders are more 
important?’ or ‘how do we make trade-offs among stakeholders?’  We see this as a 
secondary issue.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 26.  Id. (“First and foremost, we need to see stakeholder interests as joint, as inherently 
tied together . . . Stakeholder theory suggests that executives try to reframe the questions.  
How can we invest in new products and create higher earnings?  How can we be sure that 
our employees are healthy and happy and are able to work creatively so that we can capture 
the benefits of new information technology such as inventory control systems?”). 
 27.  Id. at 28 (“The primary responsibility of the executive is to create as much value as 
possible for stakeholders.  Where stakeholder interests conflict, the executive must find a 
way to rethink the problems so that these interests can go together, so that even more value 
can be created for each.”). 
 28.  Id. at 28 (“If trade-offs have to be made, as often happens in the real world, then 
the executive must figure out how to make the trade-offs, and immediately begin improving 
the trade-offs for all sides.  A stakeholder approach to business is about creating as much 
value as possible for stakeholders, without resorting to tradeoffs.”)  (emphasis in original). 
 29.  See Brendan O’Dwyer, Stakeholder Democracy: Challenges and Contributions 
from Social Accounting, 14 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 28, 28 (2005) (“A successful 
stakeholder democracy relies on stakeholders being able to hold organisations to account for 
decisions impacting on their welfare.”).  
 30.  See Jeffrey Moriarty, The Connection Between Stakeholder Theory and 
Stakeholder Democracy: An Excavation and Defense, 53 BUS. & SOC’Y 820, 821 (2014) 
(discussing the early support for stakeholder democracy in the literature on stakeholder 
theory). 
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instead argued that stakeholder theory can be implemented within the 
shareholder-centric corporate governance framework that is currently the 
norm.31 
Even though many stakeholder theorists have moved away from calls 
for stakeholder democracy and corporate governance reform in general, the 
topic remains active in corporate governance literature.  Professor Moriarty 
has recently made the case that perhaps stakeholder theorists gave up too 
early on their calls for stakeholder democracy and formal corporate 
governance reform.32  He argues that if one believes that directors should 
act in the interests of multiple stakeholders, they will be more likely to do 
so if they are held jointly accountable to these stakeholder groups rather 
than just to shareholders.33  This argument certainly makes sense.  If 
accountability is not important or necessary to incentivize directors to do 
their jobs properly, then one must wonder why corporate law currently 
gives shareholders the right to vote and imposes fiduciary duties on 
directors in favor of shareholders.34  The same concerns that justify this 
arrangement under shareholder primacy would seem to apply to 
stakeholder theory.35  Thus, while not considered the sine qua non of 
stakeholder theory, the idea of stakeholder democracy and stakeholder 
involvement in corporate governance remains alive and well, and the 
 
 31.  Id. (“In recent writings, however, they claim that stakeholder theory does not 
require changing the current structure of corporate governance, which assigns the right to 
elect the board to shareholders only, and further claim to be ‘agnostic’ about the value of 
doing so.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips, et al., supra note 14, at 480, 491 
(“The notion of strict stakeholder equality, application of the theory either to the entire 
economy or exclusively to large, publicly held corporations, and concerns with changes in 
the law and corporate governance are common in the literature among stakeholder theory 
apologists and critics alike” but noting “discourse concerning the legal relationship between 
the organization and its stakeholders is welcome, but the theory does not require a change in 
the law to remain viable”) (emphasis in original).   
 32.  See Moriarty, supra note 30, at 831-32 (discussing and arguing against stakeholder 
theorists’ abandonment of stakeholder democracy as the proper governance arrangement of 
stakeholder theory). 
 33.  Id. at 833 (“According to stakeholder theory, one stakeholder group’s interests 
should not always take precedence over other stakeholder groups’ interests; rather, their 
interests should be balanced.  Thus, it seems preferable, from the point of view of this 
theory, for directors to be jointly accountable to all stakeholders than for them to be 
accountable to shareholders only, as is currently the case.”). 
 34.  Id. at 834 (“The value of accountability is reflected in U.S. corporate law . . . One 
of the reasons we expect directors to maximize shareholder value is that they are 
accountable to shareholders in periodic elections.  Directors would have less reason to do 
what is in shareholders’ interests if they were accountable to someone else.”). 
 35.  But see Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and the ‘End of History’ in Corporate Law, 
102 J. BUS. ETHICS 5, 6 (2011) (discussing Henry Hansmann’s argument for why 
shareholders are uniquely suited to be the party owed fiduciary duties by management 
because of both homogeneity of interest and costs of ownership). 
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business and law literature commonly addresses reforms to corporate 
governance to formally integrate stakeholders.36 
To fully understand stakeholder democracy, it is important to address 
exactly what its proponents mean by “democracy.”  Democracy is a fluid 
concept and does not mean the same thing to all people.37  Professors 
Hielscher, Beckmann, and Pies argue that there are two types of democracy 
which can be applied in the organizational setting, which they term “type I” 
and “type II” democracy.38  Type I democracy refers to democracy as a 
specific principle of organization which focuses on participation by 
individuals in governance and decision-making.39  In type I democracy, the 
focus is on issues such as broad voting rights and participation in the 
decision-making process as requirements for true democracy.40  Type II 
democracy focuses on the core of democracy as the voluntary consent of 
the governed to the governance arrangement such that it is seen as 
legitimate, not active participation in decision-making per se.41 
If an organization has type I democracy then it necessarily has type II 
democracy, as participatory rights in governance decisions by the 
individuals governed is simply a formal method for giving consent.42  
 
 36.  See, e.g., Schneider & Scherer, supra note 4, at 315 (advocating for a readjustment 
of the scope of corporate governance towards a stakeholder democracy approach to better 
allocate risk and legitimize business organizations); see also Greenfield, supra note 11, at 
763 (arguing for the formal integration of stakeholders into corporate governance by 
expanding fiduciary obligations to all stakeholders of the firm); see also Yosifon, supra note 
11, at 308 (arguing for the rights for consumers to vote in corporate elections, and also 
discussing granting other stakeholders the right to such a vote). 
 37.  See Matten & Crane, supra note 5, at 9-10 (noting the varying definitions that can 
be given to “democracy” and that it can carry different meanings in different cultures and 
contexts). 
 38.  Stefan Hielscher, Markus Beckmann, and Ingo Pies, Participation versus Consent: 
Should Corporations Be Run according to Democratic Principles, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 
534 (2014) (“[W]e refine the notion of democracy and distinguish between democracy as a 
specific principle of organization and democracy as a more general principle of 
legitimation.”).   
 39.  Id. at 536-37.   
 40.  Id. at 536 (“In other words, organizational principles for fostering participation in 
decision-making and participation in deliberation are seen as the essence of democracy, 
which has an important consequence.  If participation in decision-making and in discourse 
defines democracy, then the degree to which these organizational principles have been 
implemented defines the degree to which full democracy has been realized.”). 
 41.  Id. at 537 (explaining type II democracy and noting, “Here, the idea of self-
governance does not so much involve formal characteristics of the democratic process itself, 
but, instead, the ability of those affected by collective decision-making to give, in principle, 
their consent to the process.”) (emphasis in original). 
 42.  Id. at 540 (“Seen in comparison, the organizational model of democracy is a 
narrower concept that can be subsumed under the more encompassing legitimacy model of 
democracy—but not vice versa”). 
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However, type II democracy is a broader concept that can still exist even if 
type I democracy is not present.43  This is because governed parties can 
voluntarily consent to an organizational governance arrangement in which 
they have no formal participation in decision-making.44  For example, from 
the standpoint of a type I democracy, it may be undemocratic for the 
creditors of a business not to have any participatory rights in corporate 
governance.  However, one could argue that type II notions of democracy 
have been fulfilled in the traditional creditor arrangement because the 
creditors consented to it by voluntarily lending the business money without 
receiving any participatory rights in return. 
For purposes of this article, both type I and type II democracy will be 
addressed.  Since notions of democracy exist on this continuum and 
corporate law is flexible enough to allow for a great variety of governance 
mechanisms,45 both type I and type II democracy are relevant to the 
discussion of voluntarily implementing stakeholder democracy.  For 
purposes of stakeholder democracy arising from stakeholder theory, 
virtually all of its advocates discuss democracy in the type I sense.46  For 
example, Harrison and Freeman describe organizational democracy in 
business in terms of granting a broader set of people the right to influence 
decision-making in the organization.47  Likewise, O’Dwyer describes the 
basic proposition of stakeholder democracy in terms of stakeholders having 
some ability to influence managerial decision-making.48  In line with the 
literature in this area, this article will set forth methods for creating a 
corporate governance structure that is more democratic in this type I sense 
by allowing for formal participation by stakeholders in corporate 
governance.49  However, the voluntary corporate governance structures set 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 551-52 (noting that a concentration of decision power that reduces type I 
democracy can be advantageous enough to the parties involved that they consent to the 
arrangement, thus fulfilling the requirements of type ii democracy). 
 45.  See infra Part II. 
 46.  Id. at 543-46 (discussing how advocates of stakeholder democracy focus 
predominantly on type I democracy). 
 47.  See Jeffrey S. Harrison & R. Edward Freeman, Is Organizational Democracy 
Worth the Effort?, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 49, 49 (2004) (“In a broad sense of the 
term, any action, structure, or process that increases the power of a broader group of people 
to influence the decisions and activities of an organization can be considered a move toward 
democracy.  In contrast, any action, structure, or process that works to concentrate decision 
power and management influence into the hands of one or a smaller group of people is a 
move away from democracy.”).   
 48.  See O’Dwyer, supra note 29, at 29 (“[S]takeholder democracy is considered in an 
organisational as opposed to a political context and is conceived of as a means by which 
organisational stakeholders are enabled to influence managerial decisions substantially 
affecting their welfare.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 49.  See infra Part II. B. 
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forth in this article are not limited to strict, type I participatory democracy 
such as stakeholder voting rights.50 
Notably, type I notions of democracy are not static, as participatory 
rights can be granted to stakeholders in varying degrees.  For example, a 
“pure” type I organizational democracy can be imagined in which no action 
is taken without the vote of the affected parties.51  However, such an 
extreme form of governance is not required to make a corporation more 
democratic for stakeholders, even in a type I sense, as stakeholders can be 
given some level of formal participation in governance even absent a 
direct, formal vote on decisions.52  This can be accommodated through the 
unique and powerful role the board of directors serves in corporate 
governance.53  Thus, in the corporate setting, corporate governance 
structures can rest on the democracy continuum somewhat between type I 
and II democracy.  The type of organizational democracy represented by 
this structure is best explained in terms of the “team production model” of 
corporate governance, which is relevant to this article because it borrows 
heavily from stakeholder theory and represents a departure from traditional 
shareholder-centric principal/agent models of the firm.54 
C. The Team Production Model and Organizational Democracy 
In the team production model of corporate governance, the role of the 
board of directors is not merely to act as the agent of the shareholders to 
maximize their wealth, but rather to manage the firm-specific inputs of all 
stakeholders of the firm to coordinate their efforts and maximize 
productivity.55  Under this theory, the various stakeholders of the firm are 
 
 50.  See infra Part II. A. 
 51.  Notably, such an organizational structure would almost certainly be undesirable in 
a corporate setting, as it would be extraordinarily difficult and unwieldy to make timely 
decisions in the modern fast-paced business environment. 
 52.  See Harrison & Freeman, supra note 47, at 49 (noting that any move to increase the 
power of a constituency to have a hand in decision-making is a move towards democracy). 
 53.  See infra Part II. 
 54.  See, e.g., Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, A Team Production Model of 
Corporate Governance, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 9, 10 (2005) (discussing their team 
production model of corporate governance and acknowledging its relationship to 
stakeholder theory); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 254 (1999) (arguing for a theory of corporate 
law where the board of directors acts as a mediating hierarch to manage the inputs of all 
stakeholders, not just serve as agents of shareholders). 
 55.  See Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 397, 397 (2015) (noting that, under the team production model of the corporation, 
the board of directors acts “as a mediating hierarchy that balances the interests of a 
corporation’s various constituencies and does so in a way that successfully addresses, in the 
context of the publicly traded corporation, the challenges associated with fostering 
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willing to work in concert with other stakeholders to make investments in 
the firm through time, effort, money, or otherwise, because the board of 
directors acts as an independent, mediating hierarch to balance the interests 
of all of these stakeholders and to allocate the fruits of these labors 
appropriately while holding any shirkers accountable.56  Thus, just as in 
stakeholder theory, the overriding goal of the firm is to maximize the 
productivity and value of the firm for the benefit of all stakeholders, not 
merely to maximize the wealth of shareholders.57  The board of directors 
serves as the coordinator of the efforts of stakeholders to accomplish this 
goal.58 
Advocates of the team production model indirectly call for a certain 
level of stakeholder democracy through diversity on the board of directors, 
albeit without always specifically using stakeholder democracy 
terminology.59  These notions of democracy develop through board 
composition.  Under a team production view of the corporation, the 
optimally constructed board of directors will be composed of members 
from various stakeholder backgrounds.60  Unlike the views of some 
proponents of stakeholder democracy, this stakeholder presence on the 
board stems from instrumental concerns, not from notions of the right to 
democratic representation within the firm.61  Rather, if the board of 
 
productive activity requiring combined investment and coordinated effort.”); see also Blair 
& Stout, supra note 54, at 280-81 (“Thus, the primary job of the board of directors of a 
public corporation is not to act as agents who ruthlessly pursue shareholders’ interests at the 
expense of employees, creditors, or other team members.  Rather, the directors are trustees 
for the corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ 
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive 
coalition stays together.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 56.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 277-78 (discussing the mediating hierarchy of 
the board of directors and noting that corporate stakeholders “enter into this mutual 
agreement in an effort to reduce wasteful shirking and rent-seeking by relegating to the 
internal hierarchy the right to determine the division of duties and resources in the joint 
enterprise”).   
 57.  See id. at 280-81 (noting that the primary job of the firm’s board is to “keep 
everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together”). 
 58.  Id.   
 59.  Kaufman & Englander, supra note 54, at 13 (arguing that the board of directors 
should be composed of a diverse group of stakeholders to enhance its decision-making 
abilities); see also Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, Behavioral Economics, Federalism, 
and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 421, 427 (2011) (“Value 
creation, unique risk and strategic information comprise the basic categories for selecting 
corporate directors (coordinators) who can reproduce, in effect, the firm’s core 
competencies – the firm’s core stakeholders.”) (internal citations omitted).   
 60.  Id.   
 61.  See Kaufman & Englander, supra note 54, at 13 (“Corporate stakeholder 
representation does not derive from democratic rights nor is the firm a democratic 
institution.”) (emphasis in original). 
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directors is to act as a mediating hierarch to coordinate team member 
efforts and maximize productivity, the expertise brought to the table via a 
diverse group of stakeholders will increase the likelihood of value 
creation.62 
The team production model, as originally envisioned by Blair and 
Stout, stops short of calling for true type I democracy, as it allows for 
shareholders to retain the right to elect directors and it does not necessitate 
legal reform to change this norm.63  This is because, under the team 
production model, to best serve its function, the board of directors should 
be a neutral mediating hierarch and remain outside the strong influence of 
any particular stakeholder group who might try to influence the board to 
extract economic rents.64  While granting voting rights to shareholders only 
would seem to give them preferable status and outsized influence over the 
board, under the current status quo in public companies, boards of directors 
are self-nominating and shareholders almost invariably elect the slate of 
directors put forward by the existing board, allowing the board to remain 
largely independent.65  Thus, the current arrangement of shareholder voting 
does not cause concern for the team production model, but the lack of 
diversity of interests on most corporate boards does.66 
This push for board diversity and movement away from a shareholder 
agency model of the firm represented by the team production model is in 
 
 62.  Id. at 12 (“Rather than conceiving of boards solely as monitoring agents for 
shareholders, the team production model asks that the board replicate team members, both 
within and connected to the firm, who add value, assume unique risks, and possess strategic 
information in the corporation.  When chosen by these three criteria, directors bring to the 
board the know-how by which the firm competes, the information required for engaging 
management in serious deliberations, and the expertise to evaluate managers on multiple 
performance standards.”). 
 63.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 327 (“Thus, at a normative level our story 
cautions against attempts to ‘reform’ corporate law either by contractarians who want to 
enhance shareholders’ power over directors, or progressives who want to give other 
stakeholders greater control rights.”). 
 64.  Id. at 321-22 (discussing how the board of directors should remain largely 
independent from shareholder as well as stakeholder intervention in order to best serve its 
function).  
 65.  Id. at 311 (“The net result is that shareholders in public corporations do not in any 
realistic sense elect boards.  Rather, boards elect themselves.  Once elected, moreover, 
directors almost always get to serve a full term free of shareholder control.  Although 
shareholders can sometimes try to remove directors, the removal process is difficult at best, 
and subject to the same proxy rules and collective action problems.”) (internal footnotes 
omitted).  
 66.  See, e.g., Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll, A Team Production Approach to 
Corporate Law and Board Composition, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 380, 388 (2009) 
(discussing how the team production model supports limiting the number of outside CEOs 
on boards of directors, which commonly represent a large number of the independent 
directors on many public company boards). 
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effect a call for a stronger form of organizational democracy than currently 
exists; somewhat between basic type II consent and type I direct 
participation rights.67  Additionally, while not calling for voting rights, 
some proponents of the team production model have argued that the board 
of directors should owe fiduciary duties to certain stakeholders besides 
shareholders, which moves closer to type I participation rights via granting 
standing to stakeholders to bring a derivative suit.68  Accordingly, while 
perhaps not as strong as the calls for democracy under certain branches of 
stakeholder theory, the team production model can also be interpreted as 
calling for more expansive involvement of stakeholders in corporate 
governance.69  Thus, the methods set forth in this article to incorporate 
more stakeholder involvement in the board of directors can also be seen as 
a way to voluntarily create a more democratic corporate governance 
structure in line with this model of the firm. 
D. Legal Reform and the Instrumental Claims of Democratic 
Corporate Governance 
Whether based upon normative or instrumental concerns, it is unlikely 
that U.S. corporate law will be reformed to mandate stakeholder democracy 
any time soon.  The prevailing norm of shareholder primacy is simply too 
strong and has become deeply embedded in the business and legal culture 
of the U.S.70 However, this raises the issue addressed in this article, which 
has received little, if any, attention from advocates for stakeholder 
democracy.  While some stakeholder theorists call for stakeholder 
democracy due to normative ethical concerns that rest upon notions of 
 
 67.  See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (discussing type I and type II 
democracy). 
 68.  See Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 
in Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 623, 634 (2003) (arguing, under the team production model, for fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty to be owed to the entire enterprise and to be enforceable by each class of 
stakeholder); see also Thomas Clarke, The Long Road to Reformulating the Understanding 
of Directors’ Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 436 
(2015) (discussing corporate governance in terms of both stakeholder theory and the team 
production model and calling for a reformulation of “corporate purpose, corporate 
governance, and directors’ duties”).   
 69.  See Crespi, supra note 68, at 634 (arguing for extending decision making authority 
within the corporation to all classes of stakeholders).  
 70.  See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 977-82 (2006) (noting the strength of the norms of shareholder 
primacy and shareholder wealth maximization, and how they have gained broad acceptance 
in the legal and business academies). 
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fairness, right to representation, and accountability to stakeholders,71 
normative ethical reasoning is not the only basis for the push towards more 
democratic corporate governance.  Many of the arguments for stakeholder 
democracy, from both stakeholder theorists as well as the watered-down 
version of democracy found in the team production model, are instrumental 
in nature— that a firm will be better managed and obtain better results 
under some level of stakeholder democracy.72 
If the instrumental claims for more active stakeholder participation in 
corporate governance are valid, the more important question for advancing 
stakeholder democracy is not how to reform the law (a monumental and 
slow-moving task) but whether this allegedly superior form of corporate 
governance can be voluntarily enacted under current law.  Because if so, 
and if stakeholder democracy truly is a more optimal way to manage a 
business, both entrepreneurial and established firms should be encouraged 
to implement these forms of governance without waiting for legal mandate.  
Furthermore, if stakeholder democracy can be voluntarily created, and I 
argue that it can, then stakeholder theorists need to address the 
inconvenient question of why market forces have not already resulted in 
such arrangements.  To begin to address this issue, this article will next 
discuss the structure of corporate law in the United States, and set forth 
methods for how stakeholder democracy can be voluntarily created by for-
profit corporations under this existing legal structure. 
II. PRIVATELY CREATED STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY UNDER 
EXISTING LAW 
In order to understand how stakeholder democracy can be created 
under existing U.S. corporate law, one must first understand its basic 
structure.  In the United States, corporations are creatures of statute, created 
almost exclusively at the state level, with Delaware being the most popular 
state of incorporation.73  These corporate law statutes create a web of rules, 
 
 71.  See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 30, at 831-32 (discussing normative ethical grounds 
rooted in Kantian and Rawlsian ethics for stakeholder democracy). 
 72.  Id. at 832-37 (making an instrumental argument for stakeholder democracy that 
because of biases, stakeholder interests will more likely be balanced if stakeholders can vote 
for directors); see also Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Democracy: Redesigning the 
Governance of Firms and Bureaucracies, 23 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 321, 337-42 (1994) 
(setting forth various arguments for why integrating stakeholders into corporate governance 
can result in competitive advantages and corporate governance design criteria for doing so); 
Kaufman & Englander, supra note 54, at 13 (arguing for stakeholder representation on the 
board not because of democratic rights, but because the decision-making function of board 
of directors can best operate with a board composed of diverse stakeholders).  
 73.  For ease of reference, and because of Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law, 
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which set forth how private parties may form a corporation and how the 
corporation is to be governed.74  Some of these rules provide mandatory 
requirements, which all corporations must follow.75  However, most of 
these statutory provisions are simply enabling, and provide default rules 
that are subject to variation by the incorporator either in the certificate of 
incorporation or the by-laws.76  This provides those creating corporations 
significant latitude in structuring a corporate form to meet their particular 
needs.77 
Under the default arrangement of corporate law, commonly referred to 
as “shareholder primacy,” the shareholders are the sole stakeholder group 
with the right to vote (most importantly for the board of directors), the sole 
stakeholder group which is owed fiduciary duties by the directors, and are 
considered the residual claimants of the successes of the firm through 
capital appreciation and dividends.78  However, simply because this is the 
default arrangement of corporate law does not mean that it cannot be 
modified to grant power to other stakeholders fairly comparable to that 
wielded by the shareholders.  This is largely because, within this 
framework, the true power center of the corporation is not the shareholders, 
but the board of directors.79  While shareholders may be the residual 
 
this article will utilize and reference only Delaware corporate law throughout as a proxy for 
modern United States corporate law.  The provisions cited herein are common to modern 
United States corporate law, and thus similar or identical provisions are found in other 
states’ incorporation statutes.  Thus, the arguments made herein and the methods for 
creating a stakeholder governed corporation have broad applicability across the United 
States.  Additionally, a citizen of any state may form a corporation under Delaware 
corporate law.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2011) (stating that any person or entity, 
“without regard to such person’s or entity’s residence, domicile or state of incorporation” 
may incorporate under Delaware corporate law).  
 74.  See Gordon, supra note 8, at 1553 (discussing how corporate statutes consist of 
both mandatory and default provisions which govern the corporations inner workings). 
 75.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (a) (2011) (setting forth the matters which must 
be set forth in the certificate of incorporation, such as the name of the corporation, its 
address, and the nature of its business or purposes); Gordon, supra note 8, at 1553 
(“Nevertheless, many features of corporate law, great and small, are mandatory.”).  
 76.  See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, the 
Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leaves latitude for 
substantial private ordering, provided the statutory parameters and judicially imposed 
principles of fiduciary duty are honored.”).   
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (stating that “shareholder primacy models 
assume that shareholders both control the corporation, at least in some ultimate fashion, and 
are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary duties.”).  
 79.  See Id. at 559 (discussing the board of directors as the nexus of the firm and 
primary decision-making body); see also In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 
415 (Del. Ch. 2010) (establishing that “[a] subsequent decision involving the same 
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claimants of the firm and possess a modicum of decision-making authority 
because of their right to vote for the board of directors, corporate law is 
clear that the actual decision-making authority rests with the board of 
directors and not with the shareholders.80  Because so much power rests 
with the board, by creatively structuring the board, as well as the 
mechanisms by which membership on the board is determined, a 
corporation can be created whereby multiple stakeholders have 
representation to varying degrees. 
A. Stakeholder Representation Through Director Qualifications 
The simplest method for creating a modicum of stakeholder 
democracy in corporate governance is through prescribing membership 
qualifications for directorship.  Corporate law specifically allows for 
setting director qualifications in either the certificate of incorporation or the 
bylaws.81  Thus, to create a corporation whereby different stakeholder 
groups have representation, the corporate documents would simply need to 
be initially drafted or amended to reflect the stakeholder director 
qualifications desired.82  For example, the certificate of incorporation could 
state that the corporation will have five directors with the following make-
up: two directors who have no specific qualifications, one director who is a 
non-managerial employee or a union representative, one director who is a 
member of management, and one director who is a member of the board of 
directors of an environmental advocacy group that is important to the 
corporation.  Of course, the size of the board and relevant stakeholder 
groups will vary by corporation.  The important point is that there is 
nothing prohibiting any existing corporation from structuring their board in 
such a way. 
It can be fairly argued that such a change to board structure does not 
represent a true stakeholder democracy, because the shareholders would 
still be the only party with the authority to vote for the directors.83  
Additionally, even if a director is a member of particular stakeholder group, 
 
controlling stockholder recognizes that director primacy remains the centerpiece of 
Delaware law, even when a controlling stockholder is present.”).  
 80.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (establishing that “[t]he business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of the board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in 
its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 81.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(b) (2011) (“The certificate of incorporation or bylaws 
may prescribe other qualifications for directors.”). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See id. at § 211, 212 (recognizing stockholders as the only party entitled to vote, 
unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation). 
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in discharging his duties as a director, he would still owe fiduciary duties 
only to the corporation and its shareholders, not to the stakeholder group of 
which he is a member.84  Nevertheless, a board of directors with 
stakeholder group representation would represent a move towards 
stakeholder democracy-type governance in some very real and tangible 
ways.85 
While the shareholders do have ultimate voting authority to elect 
directors, once the directors are elected the shareholders do not have the 
right to interfere with the directors’ decision-making power.86  Thus, the 
shareholders could not directly impose their will on the board of directors, 
giving such a stakeholder board significant autonomy in managing the 
corporation’s affairs.  Neither is the fiduciary requirement to “promote the 
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”87 a strong 
impediment to stakeholder focused decision-making by such a board.  Due 
to the business judgment rule, managerial decisions made by a board of 
directors are largely insulated from judicial review.88  Provided that the 
board of directors can rationally link their decisions to the promotion of the 
corporation’s best interest, the courts will not invade their decisions.89  
 
 84.  See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (stating that “[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.  Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”). 
 85.  See Harrison & Freeman, supra note 47, at 49 (noting that, “[i]n a broad sense of 
the term, any action, structure, or process that increases the power of a broader group of 
people to influence the decisions and activities of an organization can be considered a move 
toward democracy.”).   
 86.  See Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 387 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(explaining that “[t]he reality is that controlling stockholders have no inalienable right to 
usurp the authority of boards of directors that they elect.”); see also Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 
719, 726 (2006) (noting that “[t]he result is that among the vitally important choices 
reserved to directors and denied to shareholders by corporate law are not only general 
business strategy but also such key matters as the selection of executives and other 
employees; the declaration and distribution of dividends; the setting of directors’ fees and 
employees’ salaries; and the decision to use corporate assets or earnings to benefit 
nonshareholder constituencies like creditors, employees, the local community, or even 
general philanthropic causes.”).   
 87.  See eBay, 16 A.3d at 34 (clarifying that fiduciary standards and requirements 
include “promot[ing] the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”). 
 88.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 128 (2004) (noting that “[t]he business judgment rule thus builds a 
prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit to resisting the temptation to review the 
merits of the board’s decision.”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 86, at 726 
(acknowledging that “[a]s long as directors refrain from using their power to line their own 
pockets, however, the doctrine known as the business judgment rule protects their decisions 
from shareholder challenge.”). 
 89.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that “[a] 
ARTICLE 3_BLOUNT 2-15.DOCX (BLOUNT) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:11 PM 
2016] CREATING A STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY 385 
 
Indeed, if focusing on the interests of all stakeholders is a way to attain 
better business outcomes,90 the directors on a board composed of various 
stakeholders should actually be able to better fulfill their fiduciary duties 
than a non-diverse board focused only on shareholder interests. 
For advocates of the team production model of corporate governance, 
this structure would be a more optimal form of governance, as it adds 
diversity to the board without jeopardizing its independence.91  In an 
existing corporation, such a change to the corporate structure could be 
implemented simply by a vote of the shareholders,92 or if allowed in the 
certificate of incorporation, by a vote of the board of directors.93  This 
change would be fairly low-risk, since the board could be reverted to a 
more traditional form through the same process.94  Because such a 
stakeholder board could be fairly easily undone, such an arrangement is 
subject to criticism from those advocating for stronger forms of stakeholder 
democracy.  If this is a concern, by using share classifications, more 
complex forms of stakeholder democracy can be created which would be 
far more difficult to unravel. 
B. Stakeholder Governance Through Share Classification 
Modern corporate governance rhetoric commonly frames issues of 
corporate governance essentially in terms of shareholders versus non-
shareholder stakeholders.95  Such a view ignores the reality that the status 
of shareholders is gained through the relatively simple expediency of 
 
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will 
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”).   
 90.  See Ayuso et al., supra note 9, at 425 (conducting an empirical analysis of 
stakeholder engagement and firm financial performance, and finding that, across a sample of 
426 firms, engaging stakeholders has a significant positive effect on financial performance, 
specifically in customer engagement, grievance resolution, and engagement scope and 
progress). 
 91.  See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.  
 92.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (allowing for the amendment of a 
corporation’s bylaws by vote of the shareholders entitled to vote); see also DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 242(b) (2011) (allowing for the amendment of a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation by vote of the shareholders upon a resolution from the board of directors).  
 93.  See id. (allowing for the bylaws to be amended by the board of directors, if so 
stated in the certificate of incorporation). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Steve Letza et al., Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: a Critical Review of 
Corporate Governance, 12 CORP. GOV. 242, 243 (2004) (noting that “[c]urrent analyses on 
corporate governance draw more attention to evaluating and judging the superiority of either 
the shareholder model or stakeholder model and often take part in one-sided arguments, 
sometimes with a slight modification such as an enlightened shareholder model and an 
enlightened stakeholder model.”).  
ARTICLE 3_BLOUNT 2-15.DOCX (BLOUNT) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:11 PM 
386 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
owning stock.96  This means that stakeholder democracy can be 
accomplished by turning non-shareholder stakeholders into shareholders 
through stock ownership.97  When a non-shareholder stakeholder becomes a 
shareholder, they do not lose their stakeholder interests, and, in most 
situations, their non-shareholder interests will likely be more important 
than their interests as a shareholder.98  For example, an employee of a 
company who also owns stock likely considers their ongoing employment 
much more important to their well-being than their ownership interest in 
the company.  Thus, ownership of shares by a previously non-shareholding 
stakeholder is a significant move towards stakeholder democracy because 
the stakeholder will likely use whatever power they have as a shareholder 
to advance their stakeholder interests. 
Of course, if a corporation is publicly held, any stakeholder can 
become a shareholder on their own by simply purchasing shares in the 
public securities markets.  But many stakeholders will not have the 
financial wherewithal to purchase a sufficient number of shares to have any 
real power in corporate governance.  In a privately held corporation, there 
will likely not be shares available for stakeholders to purchase, and existing 
shareholders would almost certainly resist having their financial interest in 
the company watered down through an issuance of shares significant 
enough to accommodate stakeholder democracy.  However, through share 
classification, the goal of stakeholder democracy can be accomplished in 
both publicly and privately held corporations, while still accommodating 
stockholders’ financial interests. 
Corporate law allows corporations to create classes and series of 
shares with a virtually limitless variety of characteristics.99  These 
characteristics include voting rights, financial rights, and restrictions on 
transferability.100  Thus, for example, shares could be created which have 
 
 96.  See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of 
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 309, 386 (2011) 
(making a similar argument by advocating for “stakeholder-shareholders” who use 
shareholder activism to influence corporate governance).  
 97.  Id.   
 98.  Id. at 386-87 (discussing how stakeholder-shareholders such as employees and 
pension beneficiaries can use stock ownership to assert their stakeholder interests).  
 99.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2011) (allowing for the creation of one or 
more classes of stock and one or more series of stock within each class). 
 100.  Id. (noting that “[e]very corporation may issue 1 or more classes of stock or 1 or 
more series of stock within any class thereof, any or all of which classes may be of stock 
with par value or stock without par value and which classes or series may have such voting 
powers, full or limited, or no voting powers, and such designations, preferences and relative, 
participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limitations or restrictions 
thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation or of any 
amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions providing for the issue of such stock 
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voting rights but no rights to the payment of dividends, which can only be 
owned by certain individuals or entities, and which may not be transferred 
without the permission of the corporation.101  Classes of shares can even be 
created which give the holders of that class the express right to elect their 
own director(s), as corporate law expressly provides for directors which are 
elected only by owners of a particular class or series of stock.102 
The use of share classification schemes to elect directors is not 
unprecedented.  For example, in Lehrman v. Cohen, a corporation owned 
and controlled by two families created a class of stock which held only one 
$10 par value share, but which held the right to elect a fifth member to the 
board of directors in order to break deadlocks.103  The share had no 
dividend rights, and was subject to redemption only by affirmative vote of 
four of the five directors.104  The court held that such a shareholder 
classification was valid, and that corporate law allows the creation of 
shares with or without voting rights, including special rights to elect a 
director, if so specified in the certificate of incorporation.105 
Through the creative use of share classification and restrictions, 
different stakeholder groups can be given voting rights such that they have 
the right to elect one or more directors without watering down the financial 
rights of shareholders who only desire a financial stake in the company.  
Due to the flexibility allowed to incorporators in classifying shares, there is 
a virtually endless array of methods for accomplishing this.  This article 
will provide a few example arrangements, which could be utilized to 
produce varying levels of stakeholder democracy. 
1. Stakeholder Democracy With Ultimate Control Maintained by 
Shareholders 
Suppose a corporation desires to give certain stakeholder groups 
formal representation on the board of directors but still wants to maintain a 
 
adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority expressly vested in it by the 
provisions of its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 101.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (2011) (allowing for the creation of restrictions on 
transfer and ownership of securities).  
 102.  Id. at § 141(d) (“The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any 
class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such term, 
and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation.”). 
 103.  222 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1966). 
 104.  Id.   
 105.  Id. at 233 (holding that DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) “permits the creation of 
stock having voting rights only, as well as stock having property rights only.  The voting 
powers and the participating rights. . .being specified in the Company’s certificate of 
incorporation, we are of the opinion that the Class AD stock is legal by virtue of § 151(a).”).   
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vestige of the traditional corporate governance structure where the financial 
shareholders have ultimate control of the corporation.  To create such a 
structure, the certificate of incorporation would need to be amended to 
create new classes of shares with the voting rights and restrictions 
desired.106  This can be accomplished by a majority vote of the shareholders 
upon a resolution from the board of directors proposing the amendment.107 
If the directors and shareholders wish to maintain majority control in 
the hands of the existing financial shareholders, the additional share 
classifications would simply need to be structured such that the existing 
shareholders would always maintain their majority vote.108  As a simple 
example, suppose a corporation currently has one million shares of 
common stock issued and outstanding and a board of directors with seven 
directors.  Three additional share classes (referred to herein for ease of 
reference as Class “A,” “B,” and “C”) could be created with no voting 
rights except that each has the right to elect one member of the board of 
directors.109  The amendment could further provide that the other four 
directors would continue to be elected by a majority vote of the 
shareholders of the common stock.110  If the directors and shareholders so 
desire, the shares could expressly be given no rights to any dividend 
payments or any other financial rights.111  The shares could further be 
expressly limited to ownership only by individuals with certain 
characteristics endemic to the relevant stakeholder groups, have restrictions 
on their transferability, and be subject to redemption at any time by the 
corporation.112  Thus, for example, if the stakeholder groups considered 
 
 106.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (2011) (requiring the corporation to set forth 
any classes of stocks and the rights and restrictions relating thereto in the certificate of 
incorporation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(5) (2011) (providing that a certificate of 
incorporation may be amended “[t]o create new classes of stock having rights and 
preferences either prior and superior or subordinate and inferior to the stock of any class 
then authorized, whether issued or unissued”).   
 107. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2010) (setting forth the process for amending 
the certificate of incorporation).   
 108.  Id.   
 109.  See id. at § 141(d) (“The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of 
any class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such 
term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation.”). 
 110.  Id.   
 111.  See id. at § 151(a) (providing broad rights to place limits and restrictions on shares, 
and expressly stating that classes of stock may have “such designations, preferences and 
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limitations or 
restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation or of 
any amendment thereto”).  
 112.  See id. at § 202 (c)(4) (providing for restrictions on transfer and ownership of 
securities); see also id. at § 151(b) (providing that stock may be made subject to redemption 
at the option of the corporation). 
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most important to the corporation are employees (Class A), a particular 
environmental advocacy group (Class B), and members of the community 
where the corporation is headquartered (Class C), the amendment could 
state specific restrictions on the issuance and transfer of the shares such 
that members of these particular stakeholder groups will be the only owners 
of the shares.113 
Under such an arrangement, the board of directors would be composed 
of four directors traditionally elected by the common stock holders, and 
three directors each individually elected by the members of these 
stakeholder groups.  Thus, the traditional common stock holders would 
maintain control of the board but the remaining three directors would be 
elected by these important stakeholder groups.  While this would not give 
control of the corporation to stakeholders, it would certainly give them an 
opportunity to have a voice in the formal governance of the corporation. 
One advantage of this approach for the existing common stockholders 
is that the arrangement can be unraveled and corporate governance returned 
to the status quo if the experiment in stakeholder democracy is deemed a 
failure.  However, a full unraveling of this stakeholder democracy could 
become a fairly complex process.  The basic process for unraveling this 
corporate governance structure would be to once again amend the 
certificate of incorporation to cancel or redeem the new classes of shares 
created.114  However, once the new classes of shares are issued and 
outstanding, this could be difficult.  The first impediment is that once 
additional classes of stock are created, holders of that class of stock are 
required to be allowed to vote as a class on any amendment to the 
certificate of incorporation that would affect the powers or rights of their 
shares, even if they would not otherwise have a vote under the certificate of 
incorporation.115  Since any amendment to the certificate of incorporation 
requires a majority vote of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, as well as 
the majority vote of each class of stock entitled to vote, this would mean 
that a majority of the stakeholder group would have to vote to cancel their 
own voting rights.116  Thus, even if the original common stock holders own 
 
 113.  Id.   
 114.  See id. at §§ 242-245 (providing the processes for amending the certificate of 
incorporation and reducing the capital of the corporation through retiring or redeeming 
stock). 
 115.  See id. at § 242 (b)(2) (“The holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be 
entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment, whether or not entitled to vote 
thereon by the certificate of incorporation, if the amendment would increase or decrease the 
aggregate number of authorized shares of such class, increase or decrease the par value of 
the shares of such class, or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the 
shares of such class to as to affect them adversely.”).   
 116.  See id. at § 242(b)(1) (requiring that amendments to the certificate of incorporation 
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a majority of the shares they could not unilaterally pass an amendment to 
the certificate of incorporation to cancel the new share classes or strip them 
of their voting rights.117 
There is a way to work around this problem.  Shares can be issued 
with restrictions on transferability and with redemption rights.118  Thus, the 
Class A, B, and C shares in our example can be structured to be non-
transferable to any other party other than the corporation itself and can 
additionally carry a restriction that obligates the shareholders to sell or 
transfer the securities back to the corporation or be subject to redemption at 
the option of the corporation.119  There are a myriad of ways that these 
restrictions could be structured to accomplish the objective at hand.  To 
provide a specific example, the original certificate of amendment creating 
the stakeholder class shares could expressly provide that they are issued for 
$.01 per share, non-transferable without the permission of the corporation, 
only may be held by individuals or groups possessing certain 
characteristics endemic to that stakeholder class, and redeemable at the 
option of the corporation for $0.01 per share.  Then, if the directors elected 
by the majority owners decide that it is in the best interest to end the 
experiment with stakeholder democracy, they could pass a resolution to 
redeem the stakeholder shares.120  Once the shares have been redeemed, 
there would no longer be any other classes of shares outstanding.  The 
original common stock holders would then be free to amend the certificate 
of incorporation by majority vote to cancel the additional classes of 
shares.121  Thus, under existing corporate law a corporation can provide a 
representative voice to stakeholder groups while still retaining a place of 
primacy to the common stockholders. 
2. Stakeholder Democracy Without Ultimate Control by Financial 
 
be approved by “a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon, and a majority 
of the outstanding stock of each class entitled to vote thereon as a class”).  
 117.  Id.   
 118.  See id. at § 202(c)(4) (providing for restrictions on transfer and ownership of 
securities, specifically including a restriction that obligates the holder to sell or transfer 
shares back to the corporation); see also id. at § 151(b) (providing that stock may be made 
subject to redemption at the option of the corporation). 
 119.  Id.   
 120.  See id. at § 151(b)(2) (“Any stock which may be redeemable under this section 
may be redeemed for cash, property or rights, including securities of the same or another 
corporation, at such time or times, price or prices, or rate or rates, and with such 
adjustments, as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation or in the resolution or 
resolutions providing for the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors pursuant 
to subsection (a) of this section.”). 
 121.  See id. at § 242(b)(1)-(2) (noting the methods for making amendments to a 
certificate of incorporation after receipt of payment for stock). 
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Shareholders 
Just as corporate law is sufficiently flexible to provide for stakeholder 
democracy where traditional, financial shareholders maintain ultimate 
control of the board of directors, shareholder classification can also be used 
to structure a stakeholder democracy corporate governance structure that is 
virtually impossible to unravel without the support of all stakeholders.  The 
process for doing so is essentially the same as the process outlined above, 
with the difference that a sufficient number of share classes are created to 
dilute shareholder power and fewer restrictions are placed on the new share 
classes. 
For example, using the same corporation as set forth above with 
1,000,000 shares of common stock outstanding and a board of directors 
consisting of seven directors, four or more additional share classes can be 
created, each with the right to elect a director.122  As long as the existing 
common stock holders can never elect a majority of the board, the existing 
shareholders would not have the ability to unilaterally amend the certificate 
of incorporation again.123  This would be a more “true” form of stakeholder 
democracy where no one stakeholder group has control of the board.  Even 
with such a structure, restrictions on transferability and ownership of the 
new share classifications would likely be desirable to ensure that only 
individuals who can be verified as members of the respective stakeholder 
group tied to the share class could own the shares.124 
3. Share classification restrictions under Delaware corporate law 
An arguable restriction to this share classification approach is 
Delaware’s limitation on the number of classes in which the board may be 
divided.125  Delaware law allows for classified boards in which different 
classes of directors are elected in successive years, but only allows up to 
 
 122.  See id. at § 141(d) (“The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of 
any class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such 
term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation.”). 
 123.  See id. at § 242(b) (stating that the certificate of incorporation may only be 
amended by resolution of the board of directors proposing the amendment, which then must 
be approved by the shareholders). 
 124.  See id. at § 202(c)(4) (stating that restrictions on shares can include restrictions on 
the amount of the corporation’s securities that may be owned by any person or group of 
persons); see also id. at § 151(a) (providing that classes of stock may contain 
“qualifications, limitations, or restrictions” in the certificate of incorporation). 
 125.  See id. at § 141(d) (providing that the board of directors may be divided into three 
classes, which each class standing for election in successive years). 
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three such classes.126  This provision is clearly directed towards the 
traditional staggered board arrangement, which is commonly used as an 
anti-takeover or board entrenchment device.127  Since this statutory 
provision expressly addresses board classes that stand for election in 
separate years,128 its limit of three classes arguably should not restrict the 
stakeholder classification structure proposed in this article.  This seems to 
clearly be the case since the same statutory provision that limits the boards 
to three classes if said directors are to be elected in staggered terms also 
states that the “certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any 
class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors . . . .” without 
limiting how many different classes of stock may have this right. 129  This 
part of the statute directly addresses the shareholder classification structure 
advocated for in this article and indicates that as long as the directors all 
stand for election in the same year, the number of classes of directors based 
upon shareholder classification is limitless.130  Nevertheless, the argument 
could be made that since the shareholder classification proposed herein also 
requires classifying the board, even though this provision is clearly not 
intended to address this type of classification structure by its strict terms, it 
still limits the classification of the board to only three classes.131  While I 
believe the stronger argument is that this provision only limits classified 
boards that create a staggered structure, if a corporation wishes to avoid 
this argument altogether they could simply incorporate in a state like 
Nevada, which expressly imposes no such restrictions on board classes as 
long as all of the directors are elected every year.132 
 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 887, 893-95 (2002) (discussing the traditional staggered board structure with three 
classes, each standing for election in successive years, and noting its power as an anti-
takeover device). 
 128.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011) (“The directors of any corporation 
organized under this chapter may, by the certificate of incorporation or by an initial bylaw, 
or by a bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders, be divided into 1, 2, or 3 classes; the 
term of office of those of the first class to expire at the first annual meeting held after such 
classification becomes effective; of the second class 1 year thereafter; of the third class 2 
years thereafter; and at each annual election held after such classification becomes effective, 
directors shall be chosen for a full term, as the case may be, to succeed those whose terms 
expire.”).  
 129.  Id.   
 130.  Id. (simply stating that “one or more” classes or series of stock can have the right to 
elect a director). 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.330(2) (2007) (providing that the board of directors may 
be classified into any number of classes, as long as at least one-fourth of the directors is 
elected annually).   
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Another potential concern is the consideration for which the 
stakeholder share classes must be issued.  Fortunately, Delaware law is 
very flexible in this regard.  The stakeholder exclusive share classes can 
either be sold to the relevant stakeholders or issued to the stakeholders in 
consideration of any other type of good or service the stakeholder provides 
the corporation.133  For example, if one of the share classifications is 
designated for certain important suppliers, the shares could be issued to 
them in consideration of their efforts in supplying goods, services, or both 
to the corporation.134  There are arguments that can be made for either 
approach.  By requiring stakeholders to purchase the shares, even if only 
for a nominal amount, the corporation ensures that the stakeholders care 
enough about their right to representation to pay for it.  However, by 
issuing shares to existing stakeholders in consideration of some other, non-
monetary ongoing interests in the corporation, greater participation may be 
obtained and goodwill engendered with the stakeholder group.  The 
overriding point is that corporate law gives corporations a great deal of 
discretion to bring these stakeholders into the fold as nominal shareholders 
under virtually limitless terms, financial or otherwise. 
C. Potential Publicly Traded Company Limitations: Independence, 
Voting Rights, and Board Classification Restrictions 
A potential impediment to creating stakeholder democracy through the 
board qualification or shareholder classification schemes discussed herein 
is the listing standards imposed on publicly traded companies by the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ.135  While not a concern 
for private companies, companies traded on either of these exchanges must 
follow these listing standards.136  The NYSE listing requirements provide 
restrictions related to director independence, board classification schemes, 
 
 133.  See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 153(a), (b) (2011) (providing that shares of stock 
may be issued for “such consideration, having a value not less than the par value thereof, as 
determined . . . by the board of directors” for par value shares and for “such consideration as 
is determined from time to time by the board of directors” for shares without par value).   
 134.  Id. (allowing shares to be issued for whatever consideration the board of directors 
decides).   
 135.  See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 301.00-
315.00 (2015), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections [https://perma.cc/SF39-SF4J] 
[hereinafter NYSE Manual] (setting forth the listing standards imposed on publically traded 
companies by the New York Stock Exchange); see also NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, 
NASDAQ LISTING RULES §§ 5600-40 (2015), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com 
[perma.cc/VJS6-RDLC] [hereinafter NASDAQ Rules] (setting forth the listing standards for 
publically traded companies on the NASDAQ). 
 136.  Id. 
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and shareholder voting rights.137  The NASDAQ requirements also contain 
restrictions related to director independence and shareholder voting rights, 
but have no express restrictions on board classification.138  While the 
director independence standards are not a difficult obstacle to overcome, 
determining how the board classification and shareholder voting rights 
restrictions would apply to the stakeholder democratization structures set 
forth in this article is a more difficult task. 
1. Board of directors independence requirements 
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ require listed companies to have 
majority independent boards, with few exceptions.139  The NYSE generally 
defines an independent director as someone who the board of directors 
“affirmatively determines . . . has no material relationship with the listed 
company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an 
organization that has a relationship with the company).”140  The 
commentary to the NYSE requirements notes that this determination should 
focus on independence from management and avoiding any conflicts of 
interest that could impair the director’s independent judgment.141  Because 
this definition is quite broad and vague, the NYSE manual provides several 
“bright line” standards for when a director will be automatically 
disqualified as independent.142  The NASDAQ definition follows a similar 
structure by first providing a general definition requiring board 
determination of independence, followed by several specific categories of 
persons who will not be considered independent.143 
These independence requirements are relevant to stakeholder 
 
 137.  See NYSE Manual, supra note 135, §§ 303A.01-.07, 304.00, 313.00 (describing 
and defining independent directors, independence tests, executive sessions, the 
nominating/corporate governance committee, the compensation committee, the audit 
committee, the audit committee’s additional requirements, classified boards of directors, and 
voting rights). 
 138.  See NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, §§ 5605, 5640 (describing and defining the 
board of directors and committees and voting rights). 
 139.  NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 303A.01; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, § 
5605(b)(1). 
 140.  NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 303A.02(a)(i). 
 141.  Id. (“In particular, when assessing the materiality of a director’s relationship with 
the listed company, the board should consider the issue not merely from the standpoint of 
the director, but also from that of persons or organizations with which the director has an 
affiliation.  Material relationships can include commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, 
legal, accounting, charitable, and familial relationships, among others.  However, as the 
concern is independence from management, the Exchange does not view ownership of even 
a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independence finding.”).  
 142.  Id. at § 303A.02(b)(i)-(v). 
 143.  NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, § 5605(a)(2). 
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involvement on the board because some stakeholders might not be 
considered truly independent due to their level of involvement with the 
corporation or management.  For example, if a corporation decides to 
implement a director qualification stating that one of the members of the 
board must be affiliated with a major supplier that the corporation works 
with closely, it is possible that an executive officer or director of such a 
supplier would not be considered independent if the supplier received too 
much of its revenue from the company.144  Notably, this does not prevent 
the individual from serving as a director; they would just not be considered 
an “independent director” for purposes of the majority independent director 
requirement. This restriction is not insurmountable, but does require 
consideration by an exchange-traded corporation wishing to construct a 
more diverse board of directors through stakeholder qualifications. 
2. Voting rights policies limitations on share classification 
Both the NASDAQ and the NYSE have a “voting rights policy,” 
which places restrictions on any corporate action or issuance that could 
“disparately reduce or restrict” the voting rights of existing common 
stockholders.145  The shareholder classification scheme proposed in this 
article, which would grant voting rights to various stakeholder groups, 
could certainly be interpreted as running afoul of these voting rights 
policies, since allowing stakeholders a vote through special classified 
shares would reduce the voting rights of the financial shareholders.  
However, when looking at the environment in which these voting rights 
policies were created, including SEC Rule 19c-4 which gave birth to them, 
it is apparent that these policies were designed to prevent the use of 
shareholder classifications to entrench management and were not intended 
to prevent the creation of more democratic corporate structures.146 
 
 144.  See NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 303A.02(b) (stating that individuals who are 
a current employee, or have an immediate family member who is a current executive officer, 
of a company that has received payments from the corporation in any of the last three fiscal 
years that exceed the greater of $1 million or 2% of the company’s consolidated gross 
revenues are not considered independent); see also NASDAQ Rules supra note 135, § 
5605(a)(2)(D) (stating that an individual who, or has a family member who is, a partner, 
controlling shareholder, or executive officer of a company which received payments in any 
of the last three fiscal years that exceed the greater of 5% of the company’s consolidated 
gross revenues or $200,000 is not considered independent).   
 145.  NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 313.00; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, § 
5640. 
 146.  See, e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 
19C-4, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 566-567 (1991) (discussing the history behind the creation 
of SEC Rule 19c-4, the progenitor of the current voting rights policies of the NYSE and 
NASDAQ). 
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SEC Rule 19c-4 was passed in response to share classification 
schemes, namely dual class shares, which were being used to prevent 
takeovers and entrench management.147  In these dual class structures, two 
classes of shares were created, one of which had superior voting rights.148  
If the shares with superior voting rights could be concentrated in friendly 
hands (preferably management’s) in sufficient amounts to grant control, 
then the company was essentially immune from hostile takeover.149  These 
structures were seen as being non-shareholder friendly and subject to abuse 
as a method for entrenching underachieving management at the cost of 
shareholder value.150  At the time of the passing of Rule 19c-4, any 
restrictions on dual class shares arose almost exclusively from the 
exchange listing standards, as state corporate law provided corporations 
with substantial flexibility to classify shares.151  The NASDAQ had no 
voting rights restrictions and thus allowed dual class structures.152  
Although the NYSE had previously prohibited dual class shares, it 
proposed a rule modification to the SEC that would allow dual class share 
structures in order to remain competitive with the NASDAQ.153  Rather 
than approve the NYSE’s proposal, the SEC instead adopted Rule 19c-4 
which created a uniform voting rights standard across exchanges.154  Rule 
19c-4 was similar to the current voting rights policies of both the 
NASDAQ and the NYSE and did not prohibit all dual class structures, but 
only prohibited corporate actions that “nullified, restricted, or disparately 
reduced the per share voting rights of existing common stockholders.”155  
Rule 19c-4 was ultimately struck down by the D.C. Circuit as being outside 
the scope of the authority of the SEC.156  Nevertheless, since the exchanges 
retain the authority to regulate voting rights for listed stocks, both the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ have retained voting rights policies similar to 
Rule 19c-4.157 
 
 147.  Id.   
 148.  Id. at 571. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 566. 
 151.  Id. at 574-75. 
 152.  Id. at 576-77. 
 153.  Id. at 577.   
 154.  Id. at 577-78. 
 155.  Id. at 578. 
 156.  Id. at 617 (“In contrast, as the D.C. Circuit concluded, the Act denies the 
Commission authority over corporate governance generally or the substance of shareholder 
voting rights specifically.”).   
 157.  NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 313.00(A) (“On May 5, 1994, the Exchange’s 
Board of Directors voted to modify the Exchange’s Voting Rights Policy, which had been 
based on former SEC Rule 19c-4.  The Policy is more flexible than Rule 19c-4.  
Accordingly, the Exchange will continue to permit corporate actions or issuances by listed 
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The strict text of these voting rights policies would seem to indicate 
that a shareholder classification plan structured as proposed in this article 
would not be allowed for companies traded on the NASDAQ or NYSE, 
because the implementation by an existing business of a shareholder 
classification plan proposed in this article would undoubtedly reduce and 
restrict the voting rights of existing common stockholders.158  However, 
with the aforementioned history in mind, and in light of actions that have 
been allowed by the NASDAQ and the NYSE’s interpretation of its policy, 
it is not at all clear that a share classification scheme designed to create 
stakeholder democracy would be disallowed.  Both the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ have significant flexibility in applying these policies.  Indeed, in 
its interpretations of its own voting rights policy, the NYSE has focused on 
flexibility and the economic circumstances and rationale behind the reason 
for an issuance that dilutes voting rights.159  These interpretations also 
repeatedly cite to the SEC’s own language in approving the voting rights 
policy which specifically mentioned flexibility and the business 
justifications behind disparate voting rights as issues to focus on in 
interpreting the policy.160  Thus, the NYSE’s key focus on the interpretation 
of its policy, consistent with the history behind its enactment, is ensuring 
that the corporate action or issuance has a valid economic or business 
rationale and is not merely being passed for the purpose of entrenching 
management and disenfranchising shareholders.161 
 
companies that would have been permitted under Rule 19c-4, as well as other actions or 
issuances that are not inconsistent with the new Policy.”); NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, 
§ IM-5640 (“The following Voting Rights Policy is based upon, but more flexible than, 
former Rule 19c-4 under the Act.  Accordingly, Nasdaq will permit corporate actions or 
issuances by Nasdaq Companies that would have been permitted under former Rule 19c-4, 
as well as other actions or issuances that are not inconsistent with this policy.”). 
 158.  See NYSE Manual, supra note 135, § 313.00(A) (noting that “[v]oting rights of 
existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock registered under Section 12 of the 
Exchange Act cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or 
issuance.”); see also NASDAQ Rules, supra note 135, § 5640 (stating that “[v]oting rights 
of existing Shareholders of publicly traded common stock registered under Section 12 of the 
Act cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance.”). 
 159.  See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PARA. 313, INTERPRETATION NO. 95-01 (1995), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/pdf/voting_rights.pdf [perma.cc/AJV6-QDWE] 
[hereinafter NYSE Voting Rights Interpretations] (stating that “[I]n evaluating a transaction, 
the Exchange ‘will consider, among other things, the economics of [the issuer’s] actions,’ 
and that the Exchange’s interpretations ‘will be flexible, recognizing that both the capital 
markets and the circumstances and needs of listed companies change over time.’”). 
 160.  Id. (“There may be valid business or economic reasons for corporations to issue 
disparate voting rights stock.  [Para. 313] provides the [Exchange] with a voting rights 
standard which will provide issuers with a certain degree of flexibility in adopting corporate 
structures, so long as there is a reasonable business justification to so doing, and such 
transaction is not taken or proposed primarily with the intent to disenfranchise.”).   
 161.  Id.   
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Similarly, while the NASDAQ does not provide the same in-depth 
interpretations that the NYSE does, it is clear that they have interpreted 
their policy quite flexibly.  Google was recently allowed to issue Class C 
non-voting shares on the NASDAQ to grant its founders even greater 
control than they already had under the company’s existing dual class 
structure.162  While it is true that Google already had an existing dual class 
structure, this additional issuance of shares notably diluted the voting 
power of the existing Class A voting shares even further, yet was still 
allowed by the NASDAQ.163  Thus, clearly the NASDAQ has not enforced 
its voting rights policy according to its strict terms. 
Even though these voting rights policies might require public 
companies to confront the exchange they are listed on before implementing 
a stakeholder democracy structure, it seems likely that a company could 
successfully implement such a structure, given the flexibility afforded by 
these exchanges in the past.  This is especially true if the shareholders 
themselves approve it.  The intent behind the new share issuances clearly 
would not be to entrench management, and if a company believes that 
stakeholder democracy is truly a better corporate governance structure, it 
would seem that it would not be hard to explain this business rationale to 
the exchanges.  In any case, if a change to this listing requirement is needed 
to accommodate stakeholder democracy, it would be much easier to enact 
this exchange level change as opposed to the wholesale change of corporate 
law sought by many stakeholder democracy advocates. 
3. Classified board restrictions 
The final listing standard that could affect public companies listed on 
the NYSE is the restrictions related to classified boards.164  This listing 
requirement provides that boards of directors are expected to be elected by 
all of the shareholders as a class, except in limited situations with respect to 
preferred stock, and that the NYSE will refuse to list companies with a 
board featuring more than three classes of directors.165  The NASDAQ has 
no such similar restriction, but does note that a board with more than three 
 
 162.  See Nick Summers, Why Google Is Issuing a New Kind of Toothless Stock, 
BLOOMBERG (April 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-03/why-
google-is-issuing-c-shares-a-new-kind-of-powerless-stock [http://perma.cc/N3ZK-6NLL] 
(discussing Google’s issuance of Class C shares, further increasing the voting power of 
Google’s founders who already had control under a dual class structure with Class A shares 
possessing only one vote each and Class B shares owned by the founders which possessed 
ten votes each). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See NYSE Manual, supra note 135, at § 304.00. 
 165.  Id.   
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classes may run afoul of its voting rights policy.166  Like the voting rights 
policy, this classification restriction is clearly aimed at board structures 
designed to prevent hostile takeovers or insulate the board from 
shareholder accountability, as the classified (or staggered) board is 
synonymous with takeover defenses.167  In the typical classified board, the 
board of directors is divided into classes (usually three) and each class 
stands for election in different years and serves a three year term.168  Such a 
structure serves as a strong takeover deterrent, because any hostile bidder 
would be required to win two successive annual board elections in order to 
gain control of the board.169  Winning two such elections is difficult and 
costly in its own right, but the takeover is made all the more difficult 
because in the intervening year the existing majority directors can 
implement further anti-takeover devices prior to the hostile takeover being 
completed.170  This makes a properly structured classified board a strong 
anti-takeover device.171 
The shareholder classification structure set forth in this article does 
not meet this classical definition of a classified board.172  Under the 
structure I advocate, all of the directors would stand for annual election and 
are only divided into classes to the extent that they are elected by a certain 
class of shares.173  Accordingly, it is not clear that such a structure would be 
considered a “classified board” under the NYSE listing rules, even though 
 
 166.  See Listing Center Frequently Asked Questions, NASDAQ, 
http://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/Material_Search.aspx?cid=108&mcd=LQ 
[https://perma.cc/UD7M-655L] (last visited April 17, 2015) (noting that the NASDAQ has 
no classified board restrictions, but that “if the board is divided into more than three classes, 
the structure may raise concerns under Nasdaq’s voting rights and public interest rules.”). 
 167.  See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A 
Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 326 (2000) (discussing classified 
boards, along with poison pills, as one of the most important takeover defense structures); 
Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 113 (2007), 
(“Classified boards constitute one of the most potent takeover defenses for U.S. firms 
today.”). 
 168.  See Bebchuk, Coates IV, & Subramanian, supra note 127 at 893, (“In a company 
with a staggered board, directors are grouped into classes (typically three), with each class 
elected at successive annual meetings.  For example, a board with twelve directors might be 
grouped into three classes, with four directors standing at the 2001 annual meeting, four 
more directors standing for reelection in 2002, and the remaining four directors standing for 
reelection in 2003.  With three classes, directors in each class would be elected to three-year 
terms.”) (internal footnotes omitted).  
 169.  Id. at 914. (discussing an effective staggered board with three classes, and noting 
that “[i]n fact, to our knowledge, no bidder has successfully fought through two proxy 
contests to win control of an ESB target.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
 170.  Id. at 890. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See supra Part II.A. 
 173.  Id. at 890-893. 
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it would technically create different classes of directors.  However, 
although the goal of the shareholder classification structure proposed in this 
article is not to serve as an anti-takeover device, if a sufficient number of 
classes were created such that no one class of shares controls a majority of 
the board, it could certainly have such an effect.174  Thus, it is not clear if 
this NYSE listing requirement would prevent a NYSE traded company 
from creating a stakeholder board with more than three classes or if the 
NYSE would grant an exemption from this requirement to a company 
creating the class structures for the purpose of implementing organizational 
democracy.  Of course, a company could simply move to the NASDAQ 
exchange and avoid this restriction altogether, needing to address only the 
voting rights policy.175 
While these restrictions may pose some problems to public companies 
wishing to employ a stakeholder democracy, the problems are not 
insurmountable.  Additionally, the presence of these listing restrictions 
does not undercut the basic argument of this article –- that corporate law 
itself, namely the norm of shareholder primacy, is not the constraint 
prohibiting the creation of a stakeholder democracy as many advocates of 
stakeholder rights in corporate governance assert.176  And since these 
restrictions only apply to companies listed on these exchanges, they do not 
prevent any other corporation from implementing stakeholder democracy 
as set forth herein.  Accordingly, the argument stands that it is still not a 
legal requirement of shareholder primacy found in corporate law 
preventing the creation of stakeholder democracy. 
D. Voluntary Stakeholder Democracy is Superior to Corporate Law 
Reform 
I have argued that existing corporate law is clearly flexible enough to 
allow for corporations to voluntarily conduct their business under varying 
levels of stakeholder democracy.  Now I also argue that a further claim can 
be established –- that the existing permissive legal framework of corporate 
law is superior to reforming it to mandate stakeholder democracy or any 
 
 174.  For example, if the public float of the company only has the power to elect three 
directors of a seven member board, and each of the other four directors is elected by a 
different class of shares owned by different stakeholder groups, the company would be 
effectively immune from hostile takeover. 
 175.  See supra, note 166. 
 176.  See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 11, at 772-773 (arguing that changes to corporate 
law are necessary to overcome the problems created by shareholder primacy and that one 
such helpful change would be requiring corporations to consider non-shareholder 
stakeholder interests and to give these stakeholders a mechanism for electing representatives 
to the board of directors). 
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other form of stakeholder governance.  This argument rests upon both 
philosophical and practical grounds. 
As an initial philosophical matter, stakeholder theory has its roots in 
libertarianism and voluntary managerial action, not government mandate.177  
R. Edward Freeman, widely regarded as the progenitor of modern 
stakeholder theory, states that stakeholder theory has as its basis in 
libertarian principles such as freedom, individual property rights, voluntary 
positive obligations based in contracts and promises, minimal government 
intervention, and personal responsibility.178  Thus, the philosophical 
underpinnings of stakeholder theory, and concepts of stakeholder 
democracy which arise from it, support the idea of corporations voluntarily 
creating stakeholder governance structures and managers looking out for 
the interests of stakeholders for normative ethical (it is the right thing to do) 
as well as instrumental (superior business results) reasons, not because of 
government mandate.179 
Reforming corporate law to require stakeholder governance goes 
against these original libertarian underpinnings and infringes upon the right 
of parties to order their own private affairs.  To argue for mandatory 
stakeholder governance is to essentially say to incorporators “Stakeholder 
governance is superior to shareholder primacy on both an ethical and 
instrumental level, and it is so superior to shareholder primacy that its 
forced implementation outweighs your right to privately order your own 
business affairs how you see fit.”  This is not only inconsistent with the 
libertarian background of stakeholder theory, but it is also a fairly difficult 
policy argument to make since freedom of contract is a deeply held 
American value.  The corporate governance structures advocated herein are 
consistent with the original libertarian intent behind the development of 
stakeholder theory and also respect this value of freedom of contract.  
Thus, they are more philosophically consistent with stakeholder theory than 
mandating stakeholder democracy by law.180 
Philosophical consistency aside, as a purely practical matter advocates 
of stakeholder democracy and alternative corporate governance 
arrangements in general stand a better chance of furthering their agendas by 
focusing on freedom of contract rather than trying to change corporate law.  
The essentials of corporate law, particularly the norm of shareholder 
 
 177.  See R. Edward Freeman & Robert A. Phillips, Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian 
Defense, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 331, 332,337 (2002) (noting that stakeholder theory needs to be 
refocused towards its “‘Libertarian’ background conditions” which are based upon 
voluntary managerial action).   
 178.  Id. at 336.   
 179.  Id. at 337-38 (discussing the instrumental and normative theses behind stakeholder 
theory).   
 180.  Id.   
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primacy, are firmly rooted in the U.S.181  If one were to walk into any 
university finance class in the U.S. and ask the students what the ultimate 
objective of the corporate manager is, one would almost certainly hear that 
it is maximization of shareholder wealth or something similar.182  Faced 
with this powerful established paradigm and its arguable success in 
creating economic growth, arguing that corporate law needs wholesale 
reform is a hard sell, and so far efforts to cast down the shareholder-centric 
state of corporate law in the U.S. have largely failed.183  If the instrumental 
claims of stakeholder democracy are correct, its growth is more likely to be 
encouraged by advancing practical methods for voluntarily implementing 
these structures and convincing business leaders of their superiority, rather 
than attempting the Sisyphean task of changing corporate law. 
Another practical impediment to legally mandating stakeholder 
governance is a continuing problem of stakeholder theory — defining 
exactly who the relevant stakeholders of any given corporation are.184  The 
most commonly used definition of “stakeholder” is incredibly broad — 
“[A]ny group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives.”185  While this breadth can be 
frustrating to the application of stakeholder theory in a managerial setting, 
one can see some wisdom to casting a wide net for potential stakeholders 
so that managers are thinking broadly about the various parties who their 
actions may affect.186  However, for purposes of crafting enforceable 
corporate law, a higher level of certainty regarding exactly who the 
stakeholders that managers and directors owe duties to, fiduciary or 
 
 181.  See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 70, at 976-82 (noting the broad acceptance of 
shareholder primacy in law and business). 
 182.  See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good 
Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING AND EDUC. 75, 79-80 (2005) (decrying 
the entrenchment of shareholder-centric views and agency theory being taught in 
management schools and arguing that they lead to bad management practices). 
 183.  See Yosifon, supra note 11, at 226 (while decrying the fact and calling for reform, 
admitting “[s]hareholder primacy is undoubtedly the law of Delaware, the most important 
corporate law jurisdiction in the known universe.”).  
 184.  See, e.g., Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle, & Donna J. Wood, Toward a 
Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What 
Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853, 853 (1997) (noting a lack of consensus on how 
to define what stakeholders really matter to the firm such that managers should pay them 
attention); see also Andrew Crane & Trish Ruebottom, Stakeholder Theory and Social 
Identity: Rethinking Stakeholder Identification, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 77, 78-80 (2011) 
(discussing various theories and methods of stakeholder identification). 
 185.  R. EDWARD FREEMAN, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach 46 (1984). 
 186.  See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman, Divergent Stakeholder Theory, 24 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 233, 235 (1999) (noting the conceptual breadth of stakeholder theory, but welcoming 
diverse “narratives” of stakeholder theory that are useful to management). 
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otherwise, is necessary.187  This is an inherent problem with implementing a 
legally required stakeholder corporate governance structure.188  The world 
is a complex place, and each corporation will have a different set of 
stakeholders that it considers to be its most important.  Thus, no matter 
where a corporate law statute draws the line with respect to which 
stakeholders have corporate governance rights and which do not, this line 
will always be under or over inclusive for some companies.189  Faced with 
this level of uncertainty, shareholder primacy provides a much higher level 
of workability through its simplicity.190 
The voluntary stakeholder democracy structures proposed in this 
article resolve this issue.  Through private ordering, as allowed by existing 
corporate law, each individual corporation can decide which stakeholders 
are sufficiently important to give them a role in corporate governance.  In a 
complex business world, attempting to mandate which stakeholders should 
have rights is a road fraught with peril.  More freedom, not less, is 
desirable, such that corporations and stakeholders can govern their own 
affairs and reach the arrangements that are most beneficial to them.191  If a 
particular stakeholder group feels that it should have a “seat at the table” in 
corporate governance, that group is free to negotiate for such rights.192  If a 
particular corporation with strong stakeholder values, such as a social 
enterprise,193 feels that for normative, ethical, or instrumental business 
reasons a particular stakeholder should have a say in corporate governance 
 
 187.  See Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got What it 
Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 290-91 (2010) (noting that the Company Law 
Review Steering Group charged with examining U.K. company law for reform was against 
stakeholder theory as unworkable because of its breadth). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 292 (discussing the difficulty of determining exactly which stakeholders 
should have representation on a board of directors in a stakeholder governance structure). 
 190.  Id. at 290 (“It has always been perceived that one of the strengths of the 
shareholder primacy position, certainly when compared with stakeholder theory, has been 
that it provides greater certainty and is workable.”) (footnote omitted). 
 191.  See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate 
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 104 (2010) 
(noting that the freedom to contract and the “hypothetical bargain” that all stakeholders 
enter into by interacting and contracting with corporations absent corporate governance 
rights is a basis of the dominant contractarian theory of corporate law). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What is a “Social” Business and Why Does 
the Answer Matter?, 8 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 278, 303-04 (2014) (citing Felipe M. 
Santos, A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 335, 341 (2012)) 
(discussing the difficulties of defining what differentiates social enterprises from other 
businesses, but arguing that “social enterprise” should be defined as “an organization that 
utilizes an earned income strategy to accomplish a primary organizational mission of 
creating value for one or more stakeholders besides the organizations’ shareholders or 
owners”). 
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matters, it is free to grant them this role.  There is simply no reason to 
believe that requiring any level of stakeholder governance by corporate law 
mandate would result in a consistently applied more optimal arrangement 
than what currently exists. 
Some commentators have asserted that stakeholder theory is gaining 
popularity even among large, traditional corporations.194  However, 
implementing a strong form of stakeholder democracy through share 
classification may be difficult for an existing corporation, particularly a 
large one, as the shareholders, directors, and managers would likely be 
wary of giving up power to other stakeholders.  But a newly formed or 
smaller corporation could much more easily implement such a structure.  
Social enterprises and businesses that otherwise self-identify as being 
socially-minded,195 tend to be smaller corporations and it is common for 
these types of businesses to discuss their businesses using stakeholder 
rhetoric.196  For firms such as these that are already conducting business in 
a non-traditional way by not predominantly focusing on profits, voluntarily 
adopting some degree of a stakeholder democracy governance structure 
while still relatively small would seem to be an attractive proposition and 
fairly non-controversial to their shareholders. 
Nevertheless, I could find no examples of any U.S. business, even 
among those self-identifying as social enterprises, utilizing a governance 
structure that embeds stakeholder democracy through share classification 
or that otherwise requires diverse stakeholder representation on the board 
of directors.  Why, when corporate law is flexible enough to allow for 
stakeholder participation in governance, do we not observe companies, 
including social enterprises, adopting such structures?  If the widely-held 
“contractarian” view of corporate law is correct and the corporation is a 
nexus of contractual arrangements that can be freely modified by the 
parties involved,197 we should expect to see unique corporate governance 
 
 194.  See P.M. Vasudev, The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and 
Theory: Evidence from the Field and the Path Onward, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 399-400 
(2012) (conducting a survey of the U.S., U.K., and Canadian companies in the 2012 Global 
500 and finding “near-unanimous” support for stakeholder theory at some level). 
 195.  See Santos, supra note 193, at 341-42 (contrasting the value-creating motivations 
of socially-minded corporations with the value-capturing motivations of others). 
 196.  See, e.g., Press Release, Breckinridge Capital Advisors, Breckinridge Awarded B 
Corp. Status, (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.breckinridge.com/insights/news_and_noteworthy/breckinridge_awarded_b_corp
oration_status/ [perma.cc/444E-DT2E] (announcing that Breckinridge was awarded “B 
Corporation” certification, which “legally expanded their corporate responsibilities to 
include consideration of stakeholder interests”). 
 197.  See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 10, at 123-24 (noting the dominance of the 
contractarian theory of the firm and how it has shaped corporate law over the last three 
decades). 
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arrangements like stakeholder democracy emerge to accommodate the 
needs of managers and directors that subscribe to stakeholder theory.198  
This is especially the case if stakeholder participation in governance will 
result in better business outcomes, as some stakeholder theorists suggest.199  
This observed absence of stakeholder based governance structures despite 
the legal ability to create them is an important issue for stakeholder theory 
in general, and stakeholder democracy specifically, which needs to be 
addressed by stakeholder theorists before the instrumental claims for 
stakeholder theory can be taken seriously.  Next, this article will take on 
this issue and discuss potential explanations for why corporations do not 
take advantage of the flexibility of existing corporate law and voluntarily 
create governance structures which incorporate features of stakeholder 
democracy. 
III. ADDRESSING THE ABSENCE OF STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY 
While there is a notable absence of voluntarily created stakeholder 
democracies and other stakeholder-centric governance structures, there are 
large and high profile companies that seem to expressly support 
stakeholder theory.200  A specific example is Whole Foods Market, Inc., a 
publicly traded grocery store chain which claims as its core value a 
“Declaration of Interdependence” that embeds many of the sentiments 
found in stakeholder theory.201  For example, this Declaration of 
Interdependence states that Whole Foods seeks to “instill a clear sense of 
interdependence among our various stakeholders (the people who are 
interested in and benefit from the success of our company).”202  The 
statement even seems to support at least some level of stakeholder 
democracy, as it states that keeping stakeholder interests in balance 
requires “participation and communication by all of our stakeholders. . . . 
Creating and nurturing this community of stakeholders is critical to the 
 
 198.  See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation 
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006) (noting that under the contractarian theory of the firm 
“[f]irms are believed to be heterogeneous in their governance needs and are expected to 
adopt a diverse assortment of governance arrangements. . . .  All the law needs to do is 
provide ‘off the rack’ contract terms that can be adopted, or not, to the extent they enhance 
the firm’s value.”) (citations omitted). 
 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 (discussing the suggestion by 
stakeholder theorists that stakeholder democracy will result in fairness, representation, and 
accountability). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Declaration of Interdependence, WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC., 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/mission-values/core-values/declaration-interdependence 
[https://perma.cc/WF6S-3BT4] (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 202.  Id. 
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long-term success of our company.”203  However, Whole Foods retains a 
traditional corporate governance structure with a fairly typical board of 
directors composed of outside and inside directors with business 
expertise.204  Arguably the board of Whole Foods is actually very 
shareholder-centric, as six of the eleven directors are involved to some 
degree in professionally managing equity investments.205  Thus, even a 
company with strong self-stated stakeholder management (and arguably 
stakeholder democracy) values has not formally integrated these values into 
its corporate governance structure. 
There are of course numerous plausible explanations for this absence 
of stakeholder democracy in corporate governance.  Evaluating these 
potential answers to this question raises interesting questions and criticisms 
with respect to stakeholder theory and stakeholder democracy, and indeed 
corporate governance in general. 
A. Creating a Stakeholder Democracy is Too Complex 
One potential explanation for this absence is that creating a 
stakeholder democracy is simply too complex.  It requires an in-depth 
understanding of the flexibility of corporate law and the creation of 
different rights, classifications, and restrictions with respect to shares.  This 
complexity is further exacerbated by the strength of the norm of 
shareholder primacy, which could lead to a mistaken belief that such 
complex governance structures are not permissible.206  Accordingly, the 
entrenched paradigm of shareholder primacy, coupled with the complexity 
of the shareholder arrangements necessary to create a democracy, could 
arguably serve as a barrier preventing interested companies from 
 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Board of Directors, WHOLE FOODS MARKETS, INC., 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company-info/board-directors [perma.cc/M3DG-
W64H] (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 205.  Id. Gabrielle Greene-Sulzberger serves as the principal of a diversified investment 
fund Rustic Canyon/Fontis Partners, LP; Hass Hassan is a general partner of Greenmont 
Capital; Jonathan A. Seiffer and Jonathan D. Sokoloff are both partners in Leonard Green & 
Partners, LP, an affiliate of Green Equity Investors V, LP; and Dr. Ralph Z. Sorenson is the 
managing partner of Sorenson Limited Partnership, a venture investment partnership.  
 206.  See, e.g., Matthew T. Brodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 976-82 (2006) (noting the strength of the norms of shareholder 
primacy and shareholder wealth maximization, and how they have gained broad acceptance 
in the legal and business academies); see also Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate 
Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276 (2013) (noting 
that calls for legal reform in corporate law spring from a false perception “that for-profit 
corporations must/should serve shareholder interests exclusively or primarily”) (citation 
omitted). 
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experimenting with unique corporate governance arrangements or changing 
shareholder rights. 
This argument would perhaps be convincing were it not for the 
presence of existing complex shareholder arrangements.  A common 
example of such complexity is found in the area of corporate takeovers and 
devices designed to prevent them, which inevitably involve shareholder 
rights.207  In order to prevent hostile takeovers, boards of directors and 
managers have created incredibly complex defensive schemes such as 
poison pill shareholder rights plans, “shark repellent,” and staggered boards 
of directors.208  Even a basic “flip-in” poison pill is more complex than the 
shareholder classification scheme posited in this article.209  In a “flip-in” 
poison pill arrangement, existing shareholders of a target company are 
granted the right to purchase additional shares at below market value if an 
acquirer or its affiliate purchase a threshold amount of the target company’s 
stock, usually something like ten to twenty percent of the outstanding 
shares.210  This right to purchase shares at a below market price dilutes the 
value of the acquirer’s stake, making it essentially impossible for the 
acquirer to complete a hostile takeover.211 
This is an example of one of the most basic hostile takeover defenses, 
and it is more complex than creating a simple stakeholder democracy via 
share classes with different voting rights.  Thus, when an adequate 
incentive is in place, complexity is not an impediment to creative corporate 
arrangements that contract around the default positions of corporate law.  It 
would appear that the proper incentive for corporate law creativity is 
simply protection of company management, not improvement of business 
results or corporate governance.212  This observation leads to another 
 
 207.  See Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding 
Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 655-73 (2012) (discussing various models of 
takeover devices, including the players and incentives involved). 
 208.  See, e.g., Coates IV, supra note 167, at 318, 326 (discussing various anti-takeover 
devices). 
 209.  See Barry & Hatfield, supra note 207, at 642 (discussing the structure of the “flip-
in” and “flip-over” poison pill). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 642-43 (“Accordingly, acquirers are careful to avoid ‘swallowing’ the poison 
pill—that is, acquiring enough stock to trigger its dilutive provisions.  In fact, bidders 
essentially never trigger modern poison pills.  As long as a poison pill remains in place, a 
takeover of the target corporation is effectively impossible.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 212.  See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 
381, 385 (2002) (arguing “that the poison pill is an illegitimate defense tactic that allows 
management to entrench itself at the expense of shareholders”); see also J. Robert Brown, 
Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only in: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and 
the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 309 (2009) (noting that in a study of the U.S. 
based Fortune 100 companies that were non-federally chartered, all but one had waiver of 
liability provisions in their certificates of incorporation waiving director and officer liability 
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potential explanation for the absence of more diverse boards that include 
stakeholder representation. 
B. Corporate Governance Arrangements, including Boards of 
Directors, are Not Selected for Effectiveness 
Since the board of directors serves as the main power center for a 
corporation and is the mediating hierarchy between management and 
shareholders, one would assume that the main criteria for a directorship 
would be competency and the ability to add value to the business.213  The 
team production model of the firm is built upon the assumption that the 
various stakeholders of the firm are willing to make firm-specific 
investments into the firm because the board of directors acts as an 
independent hierarchy to manage the inputs and outputs of the firm and 
manage disputes among stakeholders.214  Such a view of the board of 
directors assumes that the stakeholders, who voluntarily make their inputs 
into the firm, believe that the board of directors is reasonably independent 
and competent.215  If the role of the board of directors truly is to optimally 
manage these diverse stakeholders’ inputs, then diversity on the board, 
including diversity of interests, such as those that would arise from 
stakeholder democracy, should lead to better firm management.216  Thus, if 
directors, and by extension corporate governance mechanisms, truly are 
selected for competency and ability to maximize business outcomes, and if 
a market for corporate control does exist, one would expect at least some 
firms to have developed stakeholder representation on the board of 
directors as a method for creating competitive advantage.217 
 
to the fullest extent allowed by law, indicating that management entrenchment and 
protection drives choices in corporate governance structures).   
 213.  See Seletha R. Butler, All on Board! Strategies for Constructing Diverse Boards of 
Directors, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 61, 70-72 (2012) (discussing qualifications for boards of 
directors and stating that “[a] key challenge for board composition is building a group that 
can work cohesively, offer constructive dissent, leverage each member’s experience to 
better understand tough issues, ask thought-provoking questions, demand pertinent 
information, and make the best informed decisions, while consistently adding value”).  
 214.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 251 (discussing that the inputs of various 
“team members” to the firm are controlled by the board of directors as “an internal 
hierarchy whose job is to coordinate the activities of the team members, allocate the 
resulting production, and mediate disputes among team members of that allocation”). 
 215.  Id. at 277-78 (discussing how various stakeholders are willing to give up control 
over their own investments in the firm because “they judge their chances of capturing some 
of the significant rents that can flow from team production to be greater if they give up 
control to a decisionmaking hierarchy”). 
 216.  See Butler, supra note 213, at 73-75 (discussing the business rationale for more 
diversity on boards of directors). 
 217.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short 
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Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr. refutes this argument, and asserts that 
the idea that directors are selected based upon competency is in fact a 
myth.218  Rather, he argues that the reality is that, because of the high level 
of control of the CEO in most publicly traded companies, boards of 
directors are selected based upon their willingness to support the CEO, not 
because of their qualifications.219  Professor Brown argues that this 
overriding criterion of CEO support is a factor leading to the observed lack 
of gender and racial diversity on boards of directors.220  This same logic can 
be extended to the lack of boards of directors reflecting stakeholder 
democracy.  If the main criterion for board membership is support for 
management, then management and existing directors comfortable in their 
positions will be unlikely to support stakeholder representation on the 
board of directors.  Stakeholder representative directors would undoubtedly 
be more likely to question and monitor managers than individuals hand-
picked by the CEO. 
Thus, it is possible that a board representing stakeholder democracy 
would be a better form of corporate governance, but the reality of the 
power of management in the board selection process has halted its 
manifestation.  While this explanation is plausible for existing public 
companies, it does not explain why social enterprises and other socially-
minded companies have not adopted such structures.221  In a company 
founded on principles of prioritizing value creation for society over profit 
for shareholders,222 CEO control over the director nomination process 
should not be a significant impediment to stakeholder representation.  If the 
CEO truly believes in the stakeholder-centric mission of the organization, 
as should be the case in a social enterprise, there should be little to no 
hesitancy to provide for stakeholder representation on the board.  
Accordingly, while CEO control over the director nomination process 
 
Critique of the CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1988) (discussing how the 
market for corporate control results in corporate assets being put towards their best use, and 
noting that “[a]n open market for corporate control is a prerequisite for the dynamic process 
of economic reordering necessary for long-term economic growth.”). 
 218.  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Demythification of the Board of Directors, 52 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 131, 137 (2015) (“The general assumption is that directors are selected on the 
basis of their substantive qualifications.  This, however, is a myth.”). 
 219.  Id.  
 220.  Id. at 166 (arguing that in selecting board members based upon “reliability”, CEOs 
commonly seek out nominees from pools that tend to lack diversity: other CEOs and their 
own social and professional circles). 
 221.  See supra Part II.B.2. (describing how firms can use shareholder classification to 
promote stakeholder democracy in corporate governance). 
 222.  See Blount & Nunley, supra note 193, at 303-04 (discussing the defining 
characteristics of the social enterprise, and emphasizing the inclusion of prioritized value 
creation for non-shareholders in the definition). 
ARTICLE 3_BLOUNT 2-15.DOCX (BLOUNT) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:11 PM 
410 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
might be a strong impediment to stakeholder democracy in traditional 
profit-centric public corporations, it cannot sufficiently account for the lack 
of stakeholder democracy in corporate governance in social enterprises.  
Regardless, even if CEO control over director selection exists and is a 
problem, it might justify minor legal reform to change management 
involvement in board of director selection, but it does not justify the 
wholesale change to corporate law advocated for by some stakeholder 
theorists.223 
C. Shareholders Would Not Accept the Loss of Control Required of 
Stakeholder Democracy 
Another possible explanation for the observed lack of stakeholder 
democracy in corporations is opposition by shareholders due to a perceived 
loss of control.  If the default position of corporate law is that of 
shareholder primacy, and if shareholders value the rights that this position 
of primacy entails, then it is logical that investors would avoid becoming 
shareholders in companies that alter this norm and dilute their power in 
corporate governance.  This explanation presumes that shareholders 
actually have significant power in the modern corporation and that this 
power is valued.  At least in publicly held corporations, there is strong 
evidence that this is not the case. 
The common view of the publicly held corporation in the United 
States is that it is owned by a diffuse group of public shareholders with no 
single individual shareholder possessing substantial holdings.224  Diffuse 
ownership creates a distinct agency problem as it leads to a difficulty in 
shareholders monitoring directors through their voting power.225  This is 
because each individual shareholder has insufficient ownership to exert 
voting power individually, and lacks the ability or desire to attempt to build 
a voting coalition with other shareholders.226  This diffuse ownership, 
coupled with the ability to easily sell shares in public securities markets, 
 
 223.  See supra note 4. (citing multiple scholars’ assertions that a shift away from 
shareholder primacy towards a more democratic stakeholder corporate governance approach 
is much needed in corporate law).   
 224.  See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 
22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1377, 1377 (2009) (“Two stylized facts dominate thinking about the 
ownership concentration of public corporations—U.S. firms generally are diffusely owned, 
and U.S. firms are more diffusely owned than comparable firms elsewhere.”).  
 225.  See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 
789, 789 (2007) (“In a public company with widely dispersed share ownership, it is difficult 
and expensive for shareholders to overcome obstacles to collective action and wage a proxy 
battle to oust an incumbent board.”). 
 226.  Id. 
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has led to shareholders commonly being referred to as “rationally 
apathetic” about exerting their shareholder rights, including their right to 
vote.227  Under diffuse ownership, shareholder voting often becomes a mere 
formality and the slate of directors presented by the current board is elected 
as a matter of course.228 
In recent history, this paradigm has changed due to institutional 
ownership of shares.229  Now, most individuals invest in equity holdings 
through institutional ownership arrangements, such as mutual funds, 
exchange-traded funds, or pension funds in which the stock shares are held 
by the institutional owner for the benefit of the individual investors.230  
Theoretically, these institutional holders should have greater voting power 
as well as the ability to more easily overcome the collective action problem 
and work with other institutional owners to have a greater impact on 
corporate governance through their votes.231  This greater concentration of 
ownership in the hands of professional investment managers could 
arguably lead to the observed lack of unique corporate governance 
arrangements, such as stakeholder democracy, as these institutional holders 
would reasonably value their voting rights much more than individual 
shareholders and would not wish to have them diluted.  However, it would 
appear that even though institutional ownership has concentrated equity 
holdings, these institutional owners still do not highly value the right to 
 
 227.  See, e.g., Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally 
Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of Authority, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 547, 573 (2010) (“Most retail investors are rationally apathetic.  It does 
not make economic sense for them to invest the time to gather the information they need to 
make educated voting choices.”).  
 228.  Id. at 573 (noting that, because of their rational apathy, individual shareholders will 
typically either vote for management’s director nominees or not vote at all). 
 229.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874 
(2013) (discussing how U.S. equity ownership has changed from individual ownership to 
institutional ownership since the 1950s).   
 230.  Id. (“In 1950, the Berle-Means description advanced some twenty years earlier 
remained accurate.  Equities were still held predominantly by households; institutional 
investors, including pension funds, held only approximately 6.1% of U.S. equities.  By 
1980, however, the distribution of shareholdings had begun to shift away from households 
toward institutions.  At that time, institutional investors held 28.4% of U.S. equities.  By 
2009, institutional investors held 50.6% of all U.S. public equities, and 73% of the equity of 
the thousand largest U.S. corporations.”).  
 231.  See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 573 (2006) (“With shareholdings becoming increasingly concentrated 
in institutional hands, many believed shareholder passivity would no longer act as a bar to 
effective shareholder oversight of corporate managers.  This was thought to be especially 
true with respect to issues exhibiting economies of scale, such as process and structural 
issues, in contrast to firm-specific issues, because institutional shareholders generally own 
shares in many companies.”).  
ARTICLE 3_BLOUNT 2-15.DOCX (BLOUNT) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/16  2:11 PM 
412 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
vote or have a hand in corporate governance.232  Rather shareholders, even 
institutional ones, appear to value their right to “vote” with their dollars by 
selling shares more than their right as shareholders to vote to elect 
directors.233 
This devaluation of the vote in publicly traded companies is evident 
from the continued existence of a significant number of large publicly held 
companies with multiple share classes, which dilute the voting power of the 
publicly traded shares.234  A typical arrangement for such companies is a 
“dual class” structure wherein the publicly traded shares carry one vote per 
share, but a superior class, usually owned only by insiders, has superior 
voting rights.235  For example, both Facebook, Inc. and Google, Inc. went 
public with a dual class structure that ensured that public shareholders 
would never have the ability to usurp the founders’ control over their 
companies.236  Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, retains over 
fifty percent of the company’s voting power while owning a much smaller 
percentage of the market capitalization.237  In spite of this retention of 
control by insiders, both companies had successful initial public 
offerings.238  Google has recently diluted shareholder voting rights again, 
further entrenching the control of the company’s founders, by publicly 
issuing new non-voting shares.239  Since these companies have successfully 
raised equity capital from investors in a situation where the investors could 
never use their voting rights, even acting in concert, to elect a single board 
 
 232.  See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 229, at 867 (referring to institutional owners as 
being “rationally reticent” to utilize their voting power in corporate governance). 
 233.  Id. at 893 (“That is, the fact of poor governance or poor management at a portfolio 
company may be an element in comparative evaluation, but the indicated action for the 
institution—but not its beneficiaries—may be to ‘sell,’ not to ‘intervene.’”).  
 234.  See Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii, & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1051, 1052 (2010) 
(noting that “[a]bout 6% of the publicly traded companies in the United States have more 
than one class of common stock”). 
 235.  Id. (“In the typical dual-class company, there is a publicly traded ‘inferior’ class of 
stock with one vote per share and a nonpublicly traded ‘superior’ class of stock with ten 
votes per share.”). 
 236.  See Richard Moroney, Not All Shares are Created Equal: More Multiclass Stocks 
to Join Google in the S&P 500, FORBES (July 16, 2014, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2014/07/16/not-all-shares-are-created-equal-more-
multiclass-stocks-to-join-google-in-the-sp-500/#5ae9d4be739e [perma.cc/5MHF-RRMK] 
(explaining that “[m]ultiple share classes [like those of Google and Facebook] let company 
founders maintain control by creating closely held shares with super voting rights even after 
they have sold off the majority of their economic stake in the company.”). 
 237.  Id. (noting that, at the time of the newsletter’s writing, Mark Zuckerberg held 57% 
of the voting shares of Facebook, but only 18% of the market capitalization).  
 238.  Id. 
 239.  See Summers, supra note 162 (discussing Google’s issuance of Class C non-voting 
shares). 
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member, it would appear that investors do not highly value shareholder 
voting rights or board representation.  Thus, there is no reason to believe 
that shareholder opposition, due to a loss or dilution of control, is a 
substantial impediment to corporations adopting a stakeholder democracy.  
As long as the public shareholders are free to sell their shares in a 
competitive securities market, the loss of the right to elect the board 
through voting is fairly insignificant. 
D. Network Externalities Make the Cost of Unique Governance 
Arrangements Too High 
Even if, as contractarians assert, a market that helps direct private 
ordering in corporate contracts exists for corporate governance,240 it does 
not follow that this market is perfect and will always result in optimal 
corporate contracting terms.  We know that markets are often not perfect 
and have imperfections (such as externalities), which can lead to 
unexpected and undesirable results.241  If stakeholder democracy truly is a 
better form of corporate governance, and can be voluntarily created under 
the law, it could be that some type of market imperfection is preventing 
market forces from giving rise to stakeholder democracies or otherwise 
stakeholder governed corporations. 
Professor Klausner has proposed that a particular market imperfection, 
network externalities, may be at work in corporate contracting, resulting in 
homogeneous corporate contract terms when heterogeneity may be more 
optimal.242  Network externalities exist when the value of a product or 
service is dependent upon the number of other users of that product or 
service.243  The quintessential example of a product with network 
externalities is the personal computer.244  If only few people own 
 
 240.  See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 
SMU L. REV. 383, 384 (2007) (discussing how, under the contractarian view of the firm, 
provided that markets work well, “the parties involved will be in the best position to choose 
the rules that should govern them”). 
 241.  See, e.g., Alain Marciano, Why Market Failures are not a Problem: James 
Buchanan on Market Imperfections, Voluntary Cooperation, and Externalities, 45 HISTORY 
OF POL. ECON. 223, 223 (2013) (discussing the common view among economists that market 
imperfections, such as externalities, exist and are common causes of sub-optimal allocation 
of resources).  
 242.  See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774-89 (1995) (discussing the various network externalities that 
corporate contracts appear to exhibit). 
 243.  Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities, 94 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 822, 822 (1986). 
 244.  See Klausner, supra note 242, at 762-63 (designating personal computers as an 
example of a product with network externalities). 
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computers, the value of those computers to each individual user is greatly 
diminished, as it is unlikely that complimentary products such as software 
and peripheral devices will be created unless computers are widely 
adopted.245  As more people adopt computers, the value of the computer to 
each individual owner is increased, due to the networked nature of the 
product.246  Network externalities can lead to new innovations not being 
adopted by the market, even if an innovative new product or service is 
inherently superior to previous offerings, because of the built up value 
offered by the existing network.247  This potentially undesirable effect is 
referred to as “lock in.”248 
Corporate contracts appear to exhibit network externalities.249  As 
more people adopt particular corporate contract terms, those terms have 
more value because benefits accrue around the terms, such as judicial 
rulings interpreting them and the ability to market the firm’s securities 
because of the terms’ general acceptance.250  Thus, it could be that 
corporate governance has “locked in” around the majoritarian default of 
shareholder primacy, and the network effects of its widespread adoption 
makes it cost prohibitive for corporations to adopt alternative structures.  
This lock in effect could be exacerbated because majoritarian defaults, like 
those used in corporate law, will also tend to be “sticky” by nature of them 
being chosen as the statutory default because they are the likely majority 
position which parties would freely choose.251 
This network externalities argument has strong explanatory value for 
why we do not see more diversity in corporate contracting.  It is quite 
possible that unique corporate governance arrangements, such as 
stakeholder democracy, do not arise through market forces because 
network externalities make switching costs from the default position of 
 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id.   
 247.  See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 243, at 832 (Noting that “[f]irst-period consumers 
choose first and lock in their preferred technology, even when it is socially optimal to 
standardize on the other technology . . . . The preferred technology of the larger consumer 
group can prevail even when it is socially optimal for the preferred technology for the 
smaller group to do so.”).   
 248.  Id.   
 249.  See Klausner, supra note 242 at 774-89 (describing ways in which network 
externalities exist in corporate contracts). 
 250.  Id.   
 251.  See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1591, 1598 (1999) (Declaring that “[e]xternalities are important because the costs of 
express contracting often make defaults ‘sticky.’  More parties will be covered by a rule if 
we make that rule a default than will be covered by that rule if we make a different rule the 
default . . . . This is the iron law of default inertia.”).   
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shareholder primacy too high.252  However, a market defect such as this 
does not justify wholesale changes to corporate law to mandate stakeholder 
democracy over shareholder primacy.  Each firm is different, and thus it is 
entirely possible that stakeholder democracy will be optimal for some 
firms, while shareholder primacy will be optimal for others, necessitating a 
level of private ordering.  The current structure of corporate law allows for 
this level of diversity. 
If network externalities are the market imperfection inhibiting 
corporate contracting, the most viable area for corporate law reform is to 
modify the majoritarian default to try to reduce the lock in around 
shareholder primacy and encourage heterogeneous contracting.253  For 
example, rather than being used as a majoritarian default that incorporators 
must expressly contract around, shareholder-only voting could be set out in 
the statute as just one of a menu of other corporate governance options 
which a corporation must expressly select.254  Such a change to corporate 
law may help remove the stickiness of the majoritarian default and 
encourage alternative corporate governance arrangements through private 
ordering, without upsetting all of corporate law. 
E. Stakeholder Democracy, and Perhaps Even Stakeholder Theory, 
Are Inferior to Conventional Corporate Governance 
A final argument for why we do not see voluntarily created 
stakeholder democracies is quite simple and straightforward, but very 
possibly true—stakeholder democracy is simply inferior to the 
conventional arrangement of shareholder primacy.255  There is certainly a 
strong contingent of scholars who continue to argue that the maximization 
of shareholder wealth is the optimal objective of the corporation for both 
society and individual firms, and thus placing fiduciary duties and voting 
power solely in the hands of shareholders is appropriate.256  Perhaps the 
 
 252.  See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 728 (1997) 
(discussing how network benefits arising from commonly adopted corporate contract terms 
can result in high switching costs if a firm considers adopting a unique corporate contract 
term).  
 253.  See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 251, at 1598 (discussing how majoritarian 
defaults will by their nature tend to encourage lock-in)  
 254.  See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 242, at 839-40 (arguing that to battle the stickiness 
of majoritarian defaults, “menus” of optional terms could be utilized). 
 255.  See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1339 (2013) (noting that one potential implication of the uniformity in 
corporate contracting is that the defaults of corporate law are value-maximizing for virtually 
all firms). 
 256.  See, e.g., Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective 
Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 353-56 (2004) (asserting that the maximization of shareholder 
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dearth of alternative governance arrangements, despite the ability to create 
them, is nothing more than further evidence that shareholder primacy has 
become the entrenched standard of corporate governance because of its 
superiority.257  Simplicity does not mean inaccuracy, and oftentimes the 
opposite is the case.  The absence of alternative corporate governance 
arrangements, despite the opportunity to create them, may be nothing more 
than very strong evidence that the calls for more democratic forms of 
corporate governance are in fact unfounded.  Regardless of whether this 
assertion is true or not, it is an argument that those calling for corporate law 
reform need to face. So far it has not been adequately addressed by 
stakeholder theorists, and has been largely ignored. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The debate about optimal corporate governance structures is an 
important one, and it is one that society should continue to have on an 
ongoing basis. However, what must not be lost in this debate is that it must 
be grounded in reality, as corporate law is ultimately tested in the 
marketplace, not in academia.  The reality of corporate law is that it is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate high levels of stakeholder governance 
through voluntary private ordering.  To advance their cause, stakeholder 
democracy advocates need to address the positive aspects of this reality for 
their theory (that democratic structures of corporate governance can already 
be implemented to a great extent),258 as well as the negative aspects (the 
fact that this has not yet happened in the real world casts doubt on the 
desirability of democratic forms of corporate governance).259  By 
addressing this issue at the level of private ordering rather than corporate 
law reform, new avenues for stakeholder governance research can be 
explored, and perhaps more creative and effective methods of corporate 
governance reforms can be developed. 
Stakeholder theorists should embrace this reality and develop more 
nuanced reforms to corporate governance that respect the right to contract 
for specific corporate governance arrangements, while also encouraging 
experimentation and diversity. Such an approach allows stakeholder 
theorists to maintain the original libertarian underpinnings of stakeholder 
 
wealth is the optimal corporate objective). 
 257.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L. J. 439, 468 (2001) (discussing competitors to the shareholder model, including 
stakeholder models, and their flaws, and arguing that the “end of history” in corporate law 
has been reached and corporate law globally will continue to converge around the 
shareholder model). 
 258.  See supra Part II. 
 259.  See supra Part III. 
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theory through encouraging private ordering, and also recognizes the 
diversity in corporate governance structure that is necessary to 
accommodate diverse business needs.260  The hallmarks of stakeholder 
theory based law reforms should be facilitating private ordering, 
ameliorating or eliminating any market imperfections which may exist, and 
encouraging optimal firm-specific corporate governance, not seeking to 
mandate corporate governance arrangements applicable to all firms.  Then, 
if stakeholder theorists’ assertions are correct, they should expect to see 
stakeholder principles, such as stakeholder democracy, voluntarily 




 260.  See Freeman, supra note 177, at 337 (demonstrating the libertarian underpinnings 
of stakeholder theory). 
